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Emergency continues to grip Aceh 
Since July a political issue constantly on the front pages in Jakarta has been the likelihood that a 
civil or military emergency/martial law will be declared in Aceh. The idea was first floated by 
retired Lt. General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Coordinating Minister for Political and 
Security Affairs and soon became a major topic for the media. 
However, all the talk about declaring a state of emer-
gency in Aceh is beside the point because the Acehnese 
have been living in a state of emergency for decades. With 
the exception of a short interval of relative peace in 1999 
and 2000, most parts of Aceh can be described as war zones. 
The death toll since the beginning of the year has risen to 
around fifteen people a day, most of them civilians. Clashes 
between the TNI (Indonesian armed forces) and/or POLRI 
(Indonesian Police) on the one hand and GAM (Free Aceh 
Movement) on the other are virtually daily occurrences. 
The government's move to raise the issue of declaring an 
emergency in Aceh is more to do with the political situation 
in Jakarta where Cilangkap, the TNI headquarters, is 
increasingly calling the shots. The military leaders want to 
grab even more power than they already have. At the begin-
ning of August, Major-General Djali Yusuf, the military 
commander of Iskandar Muda, the military command of 
Aceh, made a report to President Megawati, in which he 
spoke of the continuing violence in the region and accused 
GAM of great brutality. He also announced the creation of 
a special unit, Satgas Rajawali (Rajawali Special Unit), a 
combat unit trained and equipped for counter-insurgency 
and anti-guerrilla warfare. The Rajawali units include 
troops from the army (Kopassus), the navy (Marines), the 
air force (Paskhasau) and Kostrad, the army's strategic 
corps. 
In response, President Megawati instructed Major-
General Djali Yusuf to 'act decisively' against all those 
involved in acts of violence. From that moment on, all the 
focus of attention was about declaring an emergency situa-
tion in Aceh. 
DOM and the emergency 
Ever since the birth of the Indonesian Republic in 1945, 
the use of violence by Indonesian troops has been a regular 
feature .. The resurgence of rebel movements such as the 
Darul Islam and the RMS (South Maluku Republic) in the 
fifties was met by Jakarta with swift military action, always 
accompanied by great brutality. 
After the resurgence of GAM in the late eighties, the dicta-
tor Suharto turned Aceh into a DOM (Daerah Operasi 
Militer or military operations zone), which gave the military 
free rein to do whatever they thought fit. In practice this 
meant special forces, notably Kopassus, the red berets 
combat unit, using their intelligence agents to extract infor-
mation from villagers. According to official figures, the 
death toll during DOM, from 1989 till 1998, was at least 
one thousand; a similar number disappeared and thousands 
were left physically disabled, widowed or orphaned. After 
the fall of Suharto, DOM was lifted but in 2000 the military 
started to apply the same violent methods again. DOM had 
again become the reality though no one was calling it that. 
During the Wahid presidency several new constructions 
were initiated. A special autonomy law which renamed 
Aceh as NAD (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) was enacted by 
parliament but it has made little difference on the ground. In 
200 l two presidential instructions or Inpres (Instruksi 
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Presiden) were issued to deal 'comprehensively' with the 
situation in Aceh but in practice only the security measures 
as prescribed by TNI/Polri were implemente~.. After 
becoming president in July last year, Megawat1 issued yet 
another Inpres this year which, like its predecessors, claims 
to be aimed at seeking a 'comprehensive' solution but all 
that has happened is that violence has increased signifi-
cantly since the beginning of the year. The Inpres was due 
to expire on 31 July and this has been used as the justifica-
Lt. General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (right) arriving at 
the airport received by Governor Abdullah Puteh. 
tion by the TNI to press for a stronger military solution. 
It is more than obvious that the military wants something 
more than just an Inpres. Firstly ,they want more troops in 
Aceh, and secondly, with their experiences in East Timor 
still fresh in their minds, they want to be given a legal 
umbrella that would protect them from facing charges of 
gross human rights abuses or crimes against humanity. 
Despite the successes of the recent military campaign in 
Aceh, GAM guerrilla units are still present in large numbers 
in the countryside. Members of the security forces openly 
admit that it is very difficult to distinguish GAM people 
from the local population, thereby giving credence to the 
popularity of GAM among the population. The call for an 
increase in the number of troops is the army's way of deal-
ing with this situation. 
The demand for an emergency situation in Aceh coin-
cided with the start of the ad hoc trials on East Timor, where 
a few highly-placed TNI officers are facing trial. [See sepa-
rate article.] Although no Indonesian human rights activist 
is convinced that the generals responsible for the mayhem 
in East Timor will be duly punished, the trials are neverthe-
less a humiliation for the armed forces. No one denies that 
the ad hoc trials would never have happened without strong 
international pressure. 
On the opening day of the first trial, top generals demon-
stratively sat in the first row of the public gallery and 
embraced their colleagues when they arrived in court as 
defendants. TNI headquarters, represented by spokesperson 
Major General Syafrie Syamsuddin, whose own hands are 
stained with East Timorese blood, made it clear that the 
armed forces do not accept the present situation. TNI basi-
cally wants absolute impunity in Aceh an? .~on't care 
whether it is called a military emergency, a c1v1han emer-
gency or whatever. The DOM situat~on introdu~ed in 1989 
by President Suharto gave TNI the kind of secunty they are 
now seeking. 
The political process . . 
The idea of declaring an emergency m Aceh created q~nte 
a stir in Indonesia. Outspoken NGOs were strongly agamst 
it while most public figures and politic~! comme~tators 
warned against it. Some members of parliament s~1d t~at 
the government had basically failed to handle the s1tua~1on 
in Aceh properly and concluded that TNl/POL~ had failed 
to create a conducive situation for security for the 
Acehnese. . . 
The bottom line regarding an emergency. situ~tlo? is that 
it will only worsen the situation; that 1t will mcre~se 
violence while at the same time jeopardising the negotia-
tions between GAM and the Indonesian government. In an 
attempt to sort things out, Coordinating Minister for 
Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY) paid a brief visit to Aceh to consult different s~ctors 
of society. Yet the trip was hardly n~cessary because 1t was 
obvious that everyone in Aceh, even mcludmg the governor, 
Abdullah Puteh, known as a prominent member of the 
Jakarta elite, rejected the suggestion that an emergency 
should be declared. 
There is a difference of opinion between political gener-
als like SBY and the military top brass on Aceh. SBY is 
trying to maintain a balance bem:een ~he ~ego~i~tion strat-
egy and the military strategy. Durmg hi~ bnef v1s1t to Aceh, 
civil society there used the opportumty to exp~ess total 
rejection of an emergency. Every day demo?strat~ons took 
place in Banda Aceh and in a closed meetmg with NGO 
representatives, a Position Paper by Acehnese NGOs was 
handed over expressing the view that the conflict should be 
resolved by just and democratic means while avoiding the 
military approach. . i 
What SBY succeeded in doing, whether intentionally or 
otherwise, was to tum the issue into a major political issue. 
The very idea of declaring a military emergency gave 
Acehnese civil society across the entire political spectrum 
an opportunity to speak out, saying that dialogue is the best 
way to proceed. Articles and comments in the medi~ d_rew 
attention to the fact that at the latest round of negotiations 
in Geneva in May/June, mutual agreement was reached that 
a new approach, called All Inclusive Dialogue (AID, o~i~i­
nal in English), should be pursued. Although the modalities 
of AID have not yet been worked out, the general assump-
tion is that Acehnese civil society as a whole will take part, 
which means plural representation of society on both sides 
of the negotiations. Agreement was also reached on the 
need to have a cease fire. 
Major western powers including the US and the UK have 
given clear signals to the government that negotiations is 
the way ahead. Washington gave the clearest signal by 
enhancing the role of the Herni Dunant Centre, which is 
facilitating the talks. A senior American diplomat, retired 
General Anthony Zinni, known for his mediating role in the 
Middle East conflict, was chosen by Washington to assist 
the HDC and was sent to Aceh in August. His task was 
apparently to examine the feasibility of securing a cease fire 
and how such an agreement would be monitored. 
Overall TNI Strategy 
The TNI general staff have made it clear in a number of 
statements that they reject negotiations. The generals argue 
that the talks have produced nothing and make it clear that 
they resent the very idea of the Jakarta government sitting 
round a table with 'separatists'. The army chief of staff, 
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General Ryamizard Ryacudu, has been the most forthright 
in presenting the army's logic: GAM is a separatist move-
ment which wants to disrupt the unity of the state. 
Movements like this must be eradicated ( ditumpas habis ). 
[Kompas, 12 July 2002]. 
Some generals went even further and demanded an end 
to the HDC's role. These hard-liners include the chief of 
police in Aceh, Inspector General Yusuf Manggabarani and 
the military commander in Aceh, Major-General Djali 
Yusuf whose logic is that GAM is a 'terrorist' organisation. 
This means that the HDC is aiding an 'enemy of the state' 
and should be declared subversive. 
But there are indications that all the fuss being made by 
TNI stalwarts about Aceh is part of a wider strategy to gain 
Demonstration against the state emergency in Banda Aceh 
a greater role at the heart of Indonesian politics again. Some 
military analysts argue that the Aceh conflict is being used 
by the TNI as a stepping stone back to power. 
The Maluku conflict erupted in January 1999 while the 
reputation of the TNI was at its lowest ebb. TNI's involve-
ment in starting and fostering the conflict is well known. 
The longer the Maluku conflict has continued, the more 
public opinion has shifted, from seeing the security forces 
as part of the problem to seeing it as part of the solution. 
The emergence of a strong military command in Ambon, 
Kodam Pattimura, headed by Major General Djoko 
Santoso, at present one of the toughest combat generals, is 
a clear victory for TNI. The agenda of the reform movement 
was to gradually downsize the territorial structure but 
instead of eradication, growth has been the answer by the 
TNI high command. [See separate article on Maluku.] 
The same trend can be seen in Aceh. In February this 
year, despite a wave of protests, a new military command, 
Kodam Jskandar Muda, was established in Aceh, another 
major victory for TNI. But their demands went much 
further, demanding foolproof impunity for their military 
operations. Instead of being seen as the culprit, TNI is 
emerging as the 'guardian' of law and order in Aceh, or as 
the generals define it, the only force capable of guarantee-
ing the preservation of NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik 





In economic terms, the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh have 
produced a bumper harvest for the army and the police. With 
the swift approval of parliament, the government allocated a 
generous budget increase for the TNI and POLRI, each 
getting an additional 1 trillion rupiahs (about US$ 115 
million). This was quite a feat, considering the economic 
problems still besetting the Indonesian economy, including a 
heavy domestic debt. The two territorial commands in Aceh 
and Maluku now have a tri-function: military, political and 
last but not least, an economic function. 
The funding of the armed forces is usually described as 
25 per cent against 75 per cent, the former being what they 
receive from the state budget while the latter is what they 
must find from other sources. In conflict areas like 
Maluku and Aceh, the figures are more extreme and 
are put at 10 to 90 per cent. The war economies in 
Maluku and Aceh involve security officers in prac-
tically every economic sector including a wide 
range of illegal activities such as illegal taxes, 
extortion, trafficking in women, prostitution, 
gambling and so on. In both places the military and 
police are also up to their necks in illegal logging, 
fishing and smuggling luxury goods into the coun-
try. 
The TNI has a multiple agenda in Aceh. While the 
military top in Jakarta repeatedly promise to wipe 
out GAM, it is clear that many sections of the secu-
rity forces are benefiting from the war economy 
and it is in their interest to keep the conflict going. 
The Aceh issue is also being used to blackmail the 
political elite in Jakarta, up to and including 
President Megawati, by insisting that they need all 
the manpower, equipment and money they can lay 
their hands on while enjoying impunity, allowing 
them to step up their brutality without fear of facing 
charges of human rights violations. * 
continued from p 21. 
The Indonesian chief of police of East Timor, 
Brig.General Timbun Silaen, who was in overall charge of 
security before and during the ballot, under the terms of the 
agreement reached between Indonesia and the United 
Nations, was acquitted. Five military and police officers 
who had been charged in connection with the massacre at 
the Suai church on 6 September 1999, when three priests 
and dozens of people taking refuge in the church were 
slaughtered , were all acquitted. 
Altogether eighteen persons have been indicted before 
Indonesia's ad hoc human rights courts in connection with 
the killings and devastation that preceded and followed the 
ballot in East Timor on 30 August 1999. The most senior 
army officer to go on trial is Major-General Adam Damiri, 
who was military commander of the Udayana military 
command based in Bali which was in overall charge of the 
district military command in East Timor. The verdict in his 
trial is not expected for several weeks. * 
[The editors apologise for the disjointed presentation of 
this report.] 
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Rights violations continue unabated 
The huge presence of security forces is the major obstacle to regular and detailed reporting ~bout 
rights violations in Aceh. Despite these difficulties, Acehnese NGOs as well as GAM have continued 
their monitoring about human rights violations in the regions. Daily reports continue to appear on the 
internet, a sign that serious efforts to report conditions in Aceh are a top priority. 
The daily toll of civilian casualties in 2002 is creating its 
own negative dynamics. Instead of being properly covered 
in the Indonesian press, reporting about human rights viola-
tions has declined. The press in Indonesia is relatively free 
so the explanation as to why this massive tragedy is under-
reported must lie elsewhere. There are probably several 
explanations but the main reason is saturation. Reporting 
about human rights violations in Aceh has lost its news-
worthiness. It's just the same thing every day. 
Another, more political reason is the public perception in 
Indonesia that the conflict in Aceh is a never-ending war 
between two armed forces, GAM and the TNI. Reporting in 
the Aceh press is slightly different because both sides can 
and do exert pressure on editors to publish their version of 
events and in particular, what they claim to be their own 
victories. The main daily, Serambi Aceh, regularly carries 
reports about clashes between TNI and GAM on the front 
page. Human rights groups abroad increasingly rely on 
email reports from a number of monitoring groups in Aceh. 
17 August brings new pressure 
With the approach of 17 August, Indonesia's national day, 
the Acehnese came under intense pressure to fly the national 
flag and make preparations for celebrations. Kontras, one of 
the leading human rights organisations in Aceh, reported 
that news about plans to hold an Aceh-wide strike on 17 
August led to stricter regulations being introduced to obtain 
identity cards. People were also being prevented from 
purchasing more than a single day's supply of food. 
TNI troops in Aceh, always on full alert. 
The security forces were also meting out even swifter 
summary executions of persons taken into custody. !he 
practice now becoming widespread is for persons taken mto 
custody to be moved immediately to another place whe~e 
they are heavily tortured and then put to death; the bo~y is 
found on the following day. The many summary executions 
has made it even more difficult for human rights NGOs to 
conduct investigations of abuses. 
Three women shot dead 
SIRA reported on 2 August that a unit of fully armed 
Brimob, the police combat force, entered the village of 
Meunasah Blang Kandang, Muara Dua sub-district in North 
Aceh. According to a witness, the platoon was headed by 
Sergeant Syarifuddin, known for his brutality in previous 
killings of innocent civilians. The Brimob unit carried out 
house-to-house searches and opened fire in several houses, 
killing three women in front of their homes, while a fourth 
woman was shot in the shoulder. The names of the victims 
are: 
1. Fatimah Hanafiah, 40 years 
2. Kartini Abdul Wahab, 36 years 
3. Fitridah Rasyid, 32 years 
The injured woman, Mutia, 14 years old, was taken to 
hospital in Lhokseumawe for treatment. The police has so 
far said nothing about the operation in this village but the 
increasing number of skirmishes between AGAM and the 
security forces more often than not have serious conse-
quences for villagers living nearby. North Aceh has been an 
area of conflict and a stronghold for AGAM and many 
villagers, especially in the Muara Dua subdistrict have been 
victims of grave harassment by the security forces. 
The arrest of Reihan Diani 
At the same time as demonstrations were taking place 
against declaring a state of emergency in Aceh, a demon-
stration took place in Banda Aceh on 13 July, to demand 
that the Megawati government be replaced by a people's 
government. The organisation leading the demonstration 
was Orpad (Organisasi Perempuan Aceh Demokratik, 
Acehnese Democratic Woman's Organisation). Seven 
activists of the organisation were arrested and taken to the 
police station. After interrogation, six were released but 
Reihan Diani, the chair of Orpad, was held and has 
remained in detention ever since. According to the police, 
she will face charges of insulting the head of state under 
Articles 134 and 13 7 of the Criminal Code, which makes 
her liable to a maximum penalty of six years. 
It is not the first time that Orpad has been targeted by the 
security forces. In February this year they held a demon-
stration together with women stall-holders at the main 
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market in Banda Aceh. The security forces moved to stop 
the action and arrested one person. Two months later the 
office of Orpad was raided by unidentified persons. The 
office has been receiving threatening phone calls, calling 
them prostitutes and communists. Orpad has become one of 
the main targets in civil society in Aceh and international 
campaigning is needed to attract attention to the case of 
Reihan Diani. 
Reihan's prison conditions are woeful. There is no bed in 
the police cell where she is being held and, according to 
Syarifah Murlina, her lawyer, Reihan's health has deterio-
rated. She is suffering from stomach pains and low blood 
pressure. 
Protests and inquiries about the condition of Reihan should 
be made to the local police chief: 
Kapolres AKBP A/fonds T. 
Ph. 00 62 651 21636121641 and Fax 00 62 651 41507 
The murder of Muhammad Iqbal 
Following a minor traffic accident between a student 
Muhammad Iqbal (20 years) who was riding a motorbike 
and Police Brigadier S, things quickly turned nasty. Iqbal, 
an economics student at Syiah Kuala University, tried to 
leave the scene but the officer fired a warning shot. Iqbal 
was frozen with fright and the policeman fired at his head, 
wounding him fatally. He died a few hours later in hospital 
Violence seems to be the only way to resolve problems in 
present day Aceh. 
Megawati downplays the need for action 
In December last year, President Megawati made her infa-
mous statement, assuring the security forces that they 
should not worry about committing infringements of human 
rights while they are in action. 
Now she has gone one step further, justifying the failure 
of the government and the judiciary to bring those respon-
sible for past crimes against humanity to justice. In her 
address to the highest state assembly, the MPR, at its annual 
.session il;l August, she said: 
'In reality, to gather evidence of past crimes .. . is not a 
simple or easy thing to do .... Taking action without suffi-
cient evidence, based on assumptions, ill-feeling, revenge 
or interest in bringing about disintegration of the nation and 
country will eventually produce new violations of justice, 
human rights and the due process of law.' [The Jakarta Post, 
2 August 2002] 
With such guidance from the top, no wonder nothing is 
being done to bring to justice those responsible for thou-
sands of human rights violations in Aceh, going back to the 
days of DOM, and the many serious atrocities perpetrated 
since 2000. 
'War against terrorism' overrides rights 
concerns 
The US State Department has intervened in a lawsuit 
against Exxon, the world's biggest energy company. The 
company is accused of complicity in the murder, torture and 
rape of residents near the company's plant located in Aceh. 
In a statement requested by the Washington court at the 
behest of the company, the State Department urged the court 
to dismiss the case, arguing that pursuit of the case would 
damage Washington's war against terrorism. The case is 
being brought by the International Labour Rights Fund, on 
behalf of eleven male and female Acehnese villagers whose 
relatives have been killed or who have themselves been 
victims in operations mounted by the security forces which 
are protecting the company. 
In its letter to the court, the State Department said that 
'Indonesia serves as a focal point for US initiatives in the 
ongoing war against Al Quaeda' adding 
that these efforts 'could be imperilled in 
numerous ways if Indonesia and its 
officials curtailed its co-operation in 
response to disrespect for its sovereign 
interests'. The letter also said that the 
lawsuit 'could also deter further US 
investment in extractive industries in 
Indonesia'. According to the New York 
Times (see article reproduced in the 
International Herald Tribune, 8 August 
2002), the letter was a matter of 
contention between officials favouring 
a strong stance protecting human rights 
in Indonesia and those who wanted a 
strong commitment to the war on terror. 
The State Department intervention has 
been strongly criticised by The 
Washington Post which said in an edito-
rial [10 August] that the State's argu-
ments 'are not convincing'. Recalling 
that the US administration had worked 
hard in 2000 to get oil firms to sign a 
human rights code, it asked: 'So why 
the argument in last week's letter that 
Megawati in the clutches of the military (from RAKYAT MERDEKA, 15.07. 2002) human rights obligations will unaccept-
ably deter foreign investment?' 
Human Rights Watch in Washington, 
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which is not a party to the lawsuit, accused the Bush admin-
istration of backtracking on the question of corporate 
responsibility. 'Corporate responsibility shouldn't stop at the 
water's edge,' said Kenneth Roth, executive director of 
Human Rights Watch. 'If the Bush administration is serious 
about promoting ethical business practices, it shouldn't be 
trying to stop this court case from going forward,' it said in 
a statement on 7 August. * 
The Stavanger declaration 
While politicians in Jakarta were discussing whether to 
declare a state of emergency in Aceh, in Stavanger, a remote 
Norwegian town, OAM, the Free Aceh Movement, held an 
historic three-day conference. Participants came from Aceh, 
several Asian and European countries, Australia and the US. 
Major political decisions were taken and the government 
was re-organised. 
The conference decided to change the name used since 
1976 from ASNLF (Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation 
Front) to Negara or Pemerintah Acheh (the Acheh State or 
Government). The military wing called AGAM (Angkatan 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Forces of the Free Aceh 
Movement) is now called Tentara Negera Acheh or TNA. 
The term TNA is already being used in reporting but it may 
take time before Negara Acheh is commonly used. The 
name of the capital is changed back to Kutaraja, which was 
used since the 19th century. In the fifties, the central 
government changed the name to Banda Aceh. 
The conference adopted a decision regarding the territory 
of Aceh, abandoning the claim to certain parts of Sumatra, 
which was based on treaties with the Dutch in 1873. The 
structure of the state is based on democratic principles and 
decisions were adopted regarding citizenship. 
The chief of state or Wali Nanggroe, is Teungku 
Muhammad Hasan di Tiro and several ministers have been 
appointed: Teungku Malik Mahmood is the new prime 
minister and Teungku Zaini Abdullah is minister for foreign 
affairs concurrently minister of health. The department of 
information has been improved and the office in Sweden is 
now run by a director-general. 
Diplomatic activities and international relations will be 
enhanced in Scandinavian countries, the European Union, 
North America, Australia and the South Pacific. * 
continued from page 8 
elements from both sides will continue to conduct acts of 
terror and attempts to provoke the population. Economic 
interests have also become a major r,eason why the extreme 
groups on both sides want to maintain the conflict. 
Maluku seen from Jakarta 
The situation in Jakarta remains . unclear. President 
Megawati seems to have no interest in Malukan affairs. 
While she was vice-president under Wahid she was in charge 
of resolving the Maluku tragedy but failed woefully. The 
man in charge of Malukan affairs is retired Lt. General Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the Co-ordinating Minister for 
Politics and Security, a very ambitious man and a likely 
running mate of Megawati in the 2004 presidential election. 
While SBY projects the acceptable fac.e of Jakarta, the 
military simply want to rule over Maluku in their own way. 
It is not clear whether the hardliner wings of the military are 
willing to drop their political and logistic support for the 
militia groups and whether SBY and/or the TNI headquarters 
are willing or able to create a conducive situation in which 
civil society in Maluku is able to continue with their recon-
ciliation activities. Experience during the past three years 
gives no grounds for optimism but there are hopeful signs 
that civil society is re-emerging in many parts of Maluku. * 
continued from page I 0 
over his processed logs. In March, the village head of 
Yetti, Andrias Yombori, was also told he would be shot 
unless he handed over his timber. Another villager, Franz 
Putui, was actually shot at and had bullets whizzing above 
his head to make him surrender his logs. In June, five 
other villagers from Yetti were severely beaten and forced 
down onto their knees and told to eat soil, in order to force 
them to surrender their timber. 
The ELS-HAM report contains the names of eleven 
young women all of whom were raped by members of an 
army battalion from Wonogiri, East Java, who were 
stationed in their village of Yuruf. * 










Down to Earth 
--,...-::r:::- -~ 
Down to Earth's major new report, 'Forests, People and Rights', published June 2002, 
takes a comprehensive look at the ongoing crisis in Indonesia'sforests and the continuing 
violation of forest peoples' rights. The three-part report outlines the state of the forests, 
discusses the legal framework which denies forest peoples their customary rights to forest 
lands and resources, documents the political economy of forest destruction under Suharto, 
and charts the development of large-scale plantations. 
The report then examines changes in policy and practice during the post-Suharto period 
up to the present. It considers the influences of the International Financial Institutions 
such as the IMF and World Bank, regional autonomy and pressure from civil society 
organisations. 'Forests, People and Rights~ then presents the case for community-based 
forest management as a positive alternative to 'timber-mining'. It highlights Indonesian 
organisations working in this area and includes short case studies of communities in 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Java and Lombok. 
To order printed copies of the report (58 pages) send a cheque or money order for GBP 5. 00 or USD I 0. 00 to: Down to 
Earth, 59 Athenlay Road, London SEJ 5 3EN, England. Please add the equivalent of GBP2 if paying with a non-Sterling 
cheque. An RTF version of the report is available upon request. The report will also be posted on the DTE website at 
http://dte.gn.apc.org/news.htmtiforep 
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Maluku is now a closed territory 
It is conservatively estimated that at least 9,000 people have been killed and 400,000 have become 
refugees since January 1999 when the communal conflict between Muslims and Christians began in 
Maluku. In February 2002, a peace accord known as Malino II was signed. But it was a top-down 
accord and violence has since erupted in several places, notably the bloody attack on Soya in May, 
bomb attacks on the governor's office and most recently in the Ambon market place on 27 July. 
The Malino II Accord was reached at a time of ··-··r-~;:::;:- -;-:;--::-:----;----::----:---;;;;;;;;;:::::;;;;:;;;::::;;iiiii~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii 
relative peace. People from the two communities had 
shown signs of war-fatigue and despite efforts to 
provoke conflicts, they remained localised and were 
more in the nature of elite conflicts, using extremist 
elements from both sides. 
This relatively conducive situation was not the 
result of the Accord but had been present for many 
months. Efforts at a grassroots level to reconcile the 
two communities had started cautiously and at a 
higher level with an initiative known as Baku Bae. 
The Malino II Accord was defective because it made 
no attempt to involve the reconciliation efforts 
already underway. Important leaders from both 
communities took part in the Malino II conference 
but Jakarta sent several top ministers to control the 
discussions. Such high-flown peace conferences are 
well intentioned but fail to affect the reality on the 
ground. Agreement was reached on eleven points but 
there has been hardly any follow-up. Two of the 
commissions set up during Malino II have never got 
off the ground. One of the dozens of of camps of refugees scattered in many parts of East 
Indonesia. The government has so far done very little to provide a solution 
Impunity for this huge pr~blem. . 
One result of the Accord was the establishment of an inde- conflict. The RMS movement declared mdependence on 25 
pendent team to investigate human rights violations in April 1950 an~ the government of the day took ~~ong 
Maluku and probe the role of the different protagonists. The m~asures, sendmg many troop~ to Ambon. T~e m1hta:Y 
team was installed by a presidential decree on 6 June and is wmg o! ~~ was defeat~~ but It fought a guemlla ~ar till 
headed by retired Major-General I Wayan Karya, deputy to the m1d-s1xtles. The military s.truggle ende~ .with ~he 
the Co-ordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs. cap~re of RMS l.eade~ Soumok1l and the political wmg 
There is.a great deal of scepticism regarding this team as contmued to thnve .11~ the. Netherlands where many 
the investigation teams on other issues in Indonesia have Malukans h.ave been hvmg smce. 1951. RMS p~esence o~ 
achieved so little. Nine cases have been investigated since th~ ground m Maluku has been virtually non-existent until 
the fall of dictator Suharto, starting with an inquiry into the quite recently. 
May 1998 riots, the Semanggi incidents in 1999 and most 
recently the investigation into the murder of Theys Eluay in 
West Papua. In addition, since the beginning of the Maluku 
tragedy not a single perpetrator has been convicted. The 
existence of militia groups on both sides is well known and 
their leaders are high-profile figures. The region has 
become increasingly lawless with the military and militia 
groups playing the dominant role. 
One of the aims of the Maluku investigation team is to 
conduct an inquiry into the role of RMS (the Republik 
Maluku Selatan, South Maluku Republic) and groups · 
related to this movement. Human rights campaigners like 
Orry Rachman from Kontras question this focus and insist 
that the team should concentrate on discovering why a 
small incident back in January 1999 could have sparked 
such a relentless sectarian conflict. The hard core of RMS 
activists in Maluku played no role of any significance in the 
FKM and Laskar Jihad 
Since June 2000 Maluku has been under a civilian emer-
gency, the only region in Indonesia to fall under this cate-
gory. Early in 2002 the authorities n Jakarta concluded that 
the security conditions has not improved and toyed with the 
idea of going one step further by declaring a military emer-
gency. But things have been resolved somewhat differently; 
Maluku remains under a civilian emergency but Kodam 
Pattimura, the regional military command, has been 
upgraded and is under the command of Major General 
Djoko Santoso who was previously commander of the 
second division of Kostrad, the army's Strategic Command, 
Indonesia's best trained and most heavily equipped outfit. 
With the creation of Opslihkam, (Operasi Pemulihan 
Keamanan, Operation to Restore Law and Order) as an 
umbrella, the military have assumed virtually unlimited 
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powers. Under these powers, the police force (which, in 
theory, is in charge of law and order) have been placed in a 
subordinate position. The military have closed the territory 
to outsiders and frequently conduct door-to-door searches. 
It is now clear that Jakarta, especially after the Malino II 
agreement, has concocted a scenario behind the scenes. 
Two organisations, FKM (Front Kedaulatan Maluku, 
Maluku Sovereignty Forum) and Laskar Jihad (Jihad 
Warriors) have been selected as the main culprits. Two 
FKM leaders, Alex Manuputty and Semmy Weileruny, and 
the chairman of Laskar, Jihad, Jafar Umar Thalib have been 
arrested and are expected to go on trial soon. 
The FKM and Laskar Jihad have been chosen as scape-
goats. They fit neatly into the Jakarta scenario as the main 
cause of the conflict. But Maluku watchers have recognised 
that this scenario as a sham. Neither of the organisations 
existed at the beginning of the conflict; it was only after a 
year that FKM came into existence while Laskar Jiliad, 
primarily an organisation based in Java, started sending 
hundreds of so-called volunteers to Maluku in April 2000. 
The FKM came into being as a small group of discon-
tented intellectuals who became increasingly frustrated with 
the role of the security forces and militia groups in fanning 
the conflict while the central government watched on the 
sidelines. But FKM made a political switch and adopted the 
same position as RMS, based on what it claims is the legit-
imacy of the independence declaration in 1950. The FKM 
has become widely known in Indonesia, but mainly for 
negative reasons and has failed to win popular support. It is 
seen as a reincarnation of the RMS backed by Christians, 
giving radical Muslims a pretext to attack FKMIRMS as a 
Christian ploy to establish a separate republic. 
Laskar Jihad arrived in Ambon in April 2000 for similar 
reasons, complaining of no action from the central govern-
ment, no protection for the Muslim masses from Christian 
militias like Laskar Kristus . A few thousand volunteers are 
now active members of Laskar Jihad in Maluku. The 
majority are involved in social work while about 20 per cent 
are armed militias. Some well-known military hardliners 
like Djadja Suparman have supported Laskar Jihad and are 
responsible for its radical, nationalistic line. A nationalist 
Muslim movement is a new phenomenon in Indonesia and 
is an oxymoron. 
FKM and Laskar Jihad are a highly combustible mix and 
reflect the extreme tendencies within the fractured Malukan 
civil society. It is no coincidence that the authorities are 
pinning the blame on both organisations as the main cause 
of the conflict. 
Intra-military conflict 
From the onset of the Maluku conflict, the role of the 
military and militia groups has been more than obvious. 
Analysts argue that the eruption of the Maluku conflict into . 
a full-blown communal conflict is the master-stroke of 
some top army generals in Jakarta. The conflict erupted in 
Maluku at a time when the army's political influence was at 
its lowest point. The collapse of the Suharto regime and the 
use of brutality by the security forces against students had 
eroded the influence of the military. The eruption of 
violence in Maluku was a godsend for the military to prove 
their indispensability. Instead of being seen as part of the 
problem, the security forces became part of the solution. 
This is only part of the story and part of the truth. The 
longer the communal conflict has continued, the more 
complicated the contradictions have b.eco~e. Military ~nd 
police personnel increasingly took sides m !h~ con~~~t. 
Christian soldiers joined the ranks of th~ Chr~s~1~n m1htia 
while Muslim soldiers joined the Mushm m1htla. A ~ew 
hundred security officers from both the military and pohce, 
have gone AWOL and have deserte? to one or oth~r side. 
Sometimes conflicts between umts of the secunty forces 
erupt because of different strategies. On 14 May, there w.as 
a shoot-out between a platoon of Kopassus (army ehte 
troops) and a team of Brimob, the police. elite tr?ops. 
Brimob forces were trying to arrest a notonous Chr1st1an 
militia leader, Berty Loupatty, who turned out to be a gang 
leader working as an informer for Kopassus. Two people 
from each side, were hospitalised with gunshot wounds. In 
the past three years, clashes betw~en securi~ force~ have 
happened with such frequency that it has been 1mposs1ble to 
hide the problem. 
The longer the conflict in· Maluku continues, the greater 
is the likelihood of armed conflicts occurring with the 
involvement of security officers on both sides. The econ-
omy of Maluku has basically becom~ a war eco~omy with 
members of the security forces playmg the dominant role. 
Everywhere illegal tax and fees are levied. People who need 
to travel from one district to the other can only do so under 
the protection of the security forces. Illegal business l~ke 
gambling, prostitution, illegal logging and drugs traffic~~ng 
is thriving while the trade in small arms and ammumt10n 
has also become a source of income for the military. 
A comprehensive solution? 
It is not easy to find a quick solution to the conflict in 
Maluku. At the grassroots level there is a feeling of war-
weariness and a genuine desire to end the hostilities 
between the two communities. Eruptions of violence are the 
work of extremist elements on both sides but have been 
contained, without retaliation from the other side. But at the 
same time the physical segregation of both communities has 
created alienation and a sense of distrust between the two 
communities. 
The vicious attack on Soya came after the RMS anniver-
sary on 25 April when the RMS flag was flown attached to 
balloons in several places in Ambon. Soya, a Christian 
bastion, is located on the slopes of a mountain and is not 
easily accessible for outsiders. Only professional soldiers 
like Kopassus combat soldiers would have been able to 
launch an attack, which is exactly what happened. 
Eyewitnesses say the attackers wore military fatigues and 
covered their faces . Twelve people were killed and dozens 
more were injured. 
At an earlier stage in the conflict, the Christian commu-
nity would have retaliated but a better understanding of the 
background of the attack calmed the community down. 
The recent release of Jafar Umar Thalib from prison to 
house arrest resulted in a huge bomb explosion in the 
market place of Ambon, one of the locations where Muslim 
traders have started setting up their stalls again for both 
communities. 
While there is a better understanding of the nature of the 
conflict and a desire not to be provoked by hardliners, it is 
also true that bitterness and anger still linger on in both 
communities, fuelled by the losses in each community, the 
death ofloved ones, husbands, mothers and children. It will 
take time to heal the wounds helped by the present 
conducive situation of willingness to reconcile. Extreme 
continued on page 6 
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Problems mount in West Papua 
The army have hijacked the Theys assassination case; they are treating it as an 'ordinary crime' and 
blocking further investigations. Hum an rights defenders are facing renewed threats for their legitimate 
activities while the huge influx of Laskar Jihad warriors into West Papua raises the prospect of inter-
religious conflict being provoked. The police have meanwhile announced a new operation to clamp 
down on armed and unarmed 'separatists'. 
The failure of the commission of inquiry - Komisi 
Penyelidikan Nasional KPN - set up in February by President 
Megawati to investigate the assassination of West Papua's 
foremost pro-independence leader, Theys Hiyo Eluay, lies in 
its refusal to acknowledge that the killing was politically 
motivated and that is was clearly a state crime. This was not 
unexpected considering that the KPN included military offi-
cers and was headed by a former senior police officer. 
After reporting the results of the commission's investiga-
tions to the President, Kusparmono Irsan, the head of the 
KPN, declared that six low-ranking and middle-ranking 
military officers had been identified as suspects. The 
commission had been unable to discover any motive for the 
crime, he said, but had nevertheless concluded that it could 
not be described as a gross human rights violation under 
Law 26/2000 on Human Rights Courts. The commission's 
conclusion was that it was 'an ordinary crime'. The KPN also 
recommended that the investigations should now be handled 
by the military police. [Jakarta Post, 29 April 2002] 
Investigations hijacked 
In fact, the military police were conducting their own 
investigations even before the KPN had completed its work, 
a clear signal that it was the intention of the military all 
along to hijack the investigations. There is no gainsaying 
the fact that Kopassus officers were involved in the crime: 
this was positively established early on when the local 
police were conducting their own murder investigation. The 
army's strategy now was to limit the investigation to the 
perpetrators and ensure that the planning and motivation for 
the crime would remain hidden from view. 
Theys Hiyo Eluay, the chair of the Papuan Presidium 
Council (PDP), was abducted on 10 November 2001, while 
on his way home from a reception at the Kopassus Tribuana 
base in Hamadi, near Jayapura, where he had been enter-
tained as a special guest of the Kopassus commander, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hartomo. Earlier in the day, the 
commander had gone out of his way to make sure that 
Theys would definitely attend the reception to be held that 
evening. Other PDP leaders had also been invited but 
decided not to attend. The victim's body was found on the 
following day in his abandoned car. A post mortem 
concluded that he died of strangulation. 
His driver, Aristoteles Masoka, who managed to escape 
when the abduction occurred, made his way back to the 
Kopassus base, apparently intending to report what had 
happened. He has not been seen since, and is presumed 
dead There is little doubt that he was killed at the base, thus 
eliminating the key witness to the crime. 
With the military police now in control, it has been 
announced that nine Kopassus officers will go on trial later 
this year before military tribunals and will be charged with 
'taking a life' (Article 338 of the Criminal Code) for which 
the maximum penalty is fifteen years and with 'insubordi-
nation'. This will maintain the fiction that they acted on 
their own and were not under orders from anyone to kill 
West Papua's best-known pro-independence leader. 
The nine suspects include Lieutenant-Colonel Hartomo, 
commander of the Kopassus base which Theys Eluay visited 
on the day of his abduction. He and two other middle-rank-
ing officers, Major Doni Hutabarat and Captain Rianaldo, 
will be tried before the High Military Tribunal in Surabaya 
while the other six, all non-commissioned officers, will be 
tried before a military tribunal in Jayapura, The trial was 
originally due to commence in July, then postponed till 
Theys Eluay on a happier occasion 
August; a further postponement has been hinted at. 
The results of the KPN and subsequent developments have 
been strongly condemned by West Papua's leading human 
rights organisations, ELS-HAM, Kontras and LBH, the 
Legal Aid Institute. The three NGOs, along with the secre-
tariat of the Peace and Justice Commission of the Jayapura 
Diocese, issued a statement on 10 May strongly critical of 
the KPN's investigations and of its failure to investigate the 
roots of the crime. They called for the National Human 
Rights Commission - Kornnas HAM - to set up a special 
team comprised of'credible and professional people with the 
authority to bring into the open the full truth' about the 
abduction and killing of Theys Eluay and the disappearance 
of Aristoteles Masoka. They also proposed that the UN 
Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Killings and its Working 
Group on Enforced Disappearances should be given access 
to enable them to co-operate with these investigations. 
The Rev Phil Erari, a West Papuan who was himself a 
member of the KPN, has revealed that his own team that 
was in charge of local investigations had come to the 
conclusion that the killing was 'a crime against humanity'. 
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He expressed his reservations about the commission's 
conclusions when its final report was being discussed. He 
said: 'It is difficult to expect that the military police, being a 
tool of the army, will adopt an independent position when 
investigating suspects who are members of the army'. 
[Media Indonesia, 8 May 2002] 
Demands for a credible investigation into the killing of 
Theys Eluay continue to reverberate within civil society and 
have been voiced by leaders of the Papuan Presidium 
Council, church leaders and student activists. It has become 
a constant theme of demonstrations in West Papua. John 
Rumbiak of ELS-HAM said there was clear · evidence that 
the killing was part of a secret operation to wipe out sepa-
ratist leaders' . [Asia-Pacific programme, 1 May 2002] 
The governor of West Papua, Jaap Solossa added his 
voice to these demands. He was quoted as saying that most 
Papuans are 'disappointed with the investigation's results . .. 
because they know that it was a serious violation against 
human rights' . [Jakarta Post, 1 May 2002] 
Whatever the results of the military trials, which will take 
the form of court-martials, it is clear that demands for a full 
investigation aimed at identifying the masterminds of the 
assassination and disappearance will continue to reverber-
ate in West Papua. 
Witnesses in danger 
The protection of witnesses has become a major problem. 
Several witnesses have sought protection with ELS-HAM or 
the police, after receiving threats. Some witnesses who were 
asked to travel to Jakarta by the military police for question-
ing refused to go. One of these was Yeret Imowi who later 
faced an attempt on his life when a Kopassus soldier opened 
fire at close range when they happened to confront each other 
near a food stall. Fortunately, Imowi ducked in time and was 
able to flee the spot, unharmed. The soldier, First Sergeant 
Yani, was taken into custody after the incident. 
Unknown persons also set fire to the tomb ofTheys Eluay 
but local residents who saw the incident were able to extin-
guish the flames before too much damage had been done. 
This incident can be seen as an attempt to stir up unrest and 
provoke Papuans into seeking revenge. This was also 
certainly one reason why Theys Eluay was assassinated. In 
fact, although the crime has provoked widespread anger 
throughout West Papua, the response has been restrained. 
Human rights activists targeted 
There are strong indications that prominent pro-indepen-
dence figures and human rights activists are being targeted 
by the security forces. John Rumbiak, co-ordinator of ELS-
HAM has talked of 'a mission to exterminate human rights 
activists'. He himself and Johannes Bonay, the director of 
ELS-HAM, have themselves faced threats from the security 
forces several times during the past year. 
On 22 June Yafet Yelemaken, a well-known tribal chief 
and Panel Member (local representative) of the Papuan 
Presidium Council in Wamena, died a painful death from 
poisoning. Yelemaken was still under town arrest, serving a 
sentence for allegedly 'inciting a riot' during the bloody 
events in Wamena on 6 October 2000. The fact is that he 
and the four other PDP leaders who were convicted had 
been trying to calm tensions. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 161 , 
March/ April 2001] 
Chief Yelemaken was a senior and highly-respected 
leader in the Baliem Valley who was a champion of W~st 
Papua's non-violent struggle for justice. He was also head 
of a tribal NGO, the Society for Highlands Survival. Two 
weeks before his death, he gave testimony at a meeting in 
Bali organised by the Indonesian environmental movement, 
which coincided with the UN preparatory meeting for the 
Johannesburg Earth Summit. There are strong grounds to 
suspect a political motive behind his tragic death. 
Several human rights activists in Wamena have been 
subjected to threats and intimidation. Paulus Logho, 32, is 
head of Abenaho village and a volunteer monitoring the 
human rights situation for ELS-HAM. Late at night on 19 
June, four police officers came to his house and told his 
wife they were looking for him because they want to buy 
some rice. When told they had come to 'the wrong house', 
the officers said they would go on searching for him. 
Five days later, Yulius Nirigi was accosted by a Kopassus 
officer while he was watching a soccer match. The officer 
said he was looking for Luis Logho, who is one of ELS-
HAM's contact persons in Wamena. The officer asked ques-
tions about the fact that Logho had visited the home ofYafet 
Yelemaken and joined the crowd of mourners gathered 
there. Yulius was also asked questions about the funeral of 
Yelemaken. 
Another ELS-HAM volunteer in Wamena, Karel 
Wamafrna, who works for the World Wide Fund, was told 
by a colleague that he and other activists were being 
watched by the Papua provincial police force. Reports were 
going round that these activists were regarded by the police 
as wanting to create a 'Laskar Kristen' (a Christian militia) 
to counter local militia forces and the Laskar Jihad who 
have been flooding into West Papua. 
C9rrugt army business activities coupled 
with a uses 
Indonesian troops in many parts of West Papua are 
involved in business practices which are frequently accom-
panied by human rights abuses against people whose 
belongings are forcibly seized. 
The practices are particularly widespread in the Jayapura 
regency where reports have been received of the wide-
spread stealth of processed timber. The activities are justi-
fied on the grounds that funding for military personnel 
stationed in West Papua is far from adequate. What this 
means is that West Papuans are incurring heavy personal 
losses and suffering violations to pay for the unwelcome 
presence of security forces that are occupying their country. 
According to a report from ELS-HAM received on 21 
July, Infantry Battalion 126 from the North Sumatra Bukit 
Barisan division, which has been stationed in the Arso 
region, near the border with Papua New Guinea, since last 
October, is heavily involved in this business. Processed 
timber is being illegally seized from local land owners, 
without compensation. 
As if this were not bad enough, the timber seizures are 
accompanied by acts of terror. In February this year, 
Markus Putui, from the village of Yetti was beaten with a 
rifle butt and told he would be shot if he refused to hand 
continued on page 6 
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Unexplained killings in Merauke 
Mystery has shrouded the death in September 2001 of Willem Onde, a local OPM commander in 
Merauke, together with a colleague. Investigations conducted this year by the Catholic Diocese in 
Merauke point to the involvement of Kopassus in his murder, just two months before Theys Eluay, the 
pro-independence leader was put to death by Kopassus officers. These revelations point to a systematic 
Kopassus intelligence operation directed against pro-independence West Papuans. 
This is the story of a local OPM commander who thought 
he could make peace with the Indonesian military but who 
never relinquished his pro-independence loyalties. In the 
end, he fell victim to an intelligence operation by the army's 
masterly intel operators, Kopassus. 
The name of Willem Onde, a local OPM (Organisasi 
Papua Merdeka,) commander in the Merauke region first 
came to prominence when he took sixteen employees of a 
Korean logging company hostage in January 2001, on 
which occasion he was said to be 'working with military'. 
After the hostages were released following negotiations 
with the military, nothing more was heard until reports 
began to circulate that he and his assistant, John Tumin, had 
been found dead under suspicious circumstances in 
September 2001. 
But now, the Peace and Justice Commission of the 
Merauke Diocese has published a detailed investigation of 
the events leading up to these deaths, in a report published 
on the authority of Archbishop of Merauke, Mgr Jacobus 
Duivenvoorde MSC, and endorsed by leaders of the 
Merauke Protestant churches. 
The main events highlighted in this very detailed report 
commence with peace talks in May 1997 between Willem 
Onde and the local military commander, resulting in a local 
ceasefire. To the dismay of other OPM units in the region, 
Onde's men handed in dozens of weapons to the TNI after 
which Onde was quoted as saying he was now 'close to the 
TNI' in the interests of peace. 
In January 2001, a group of men under Onde's command 
took sixteen employees of Korindo, a Korean timber 
company, hostage, including three Koreans. One of Onde's 
demands was for the withdrawal of Brimob troops from 
Merauke, following the shooting dead of eight Papuans 
while raising the Papuan flag in Merauke in December 
2000. Rumours circulated at the time that this action had the 
backing of Kopassus. After two weeks the hostages were 
released. Brimob troops were not withdrawn but Onde's 
demand to be taken to Jakarta to meet top-level government 
officials was met. 
Kopassus renews pressure on Onde 
In May 2001, when the government was trying to win 
support for Special Autonomy status for West Papua, Onde 
met the Kopassus commander in West Papua, Lieutenant-
Colonel Hartomo (now the main suspect in the assassina-
tion ofTheys Eluay- see separate article)who asked him to 
arrange a meeting with the OPM commander in Merauke, 
Bernard Mawen and persuade him to speak out in favour of 
special autonomy. These efforts proved futile and in a letter 
dated 1 June 2001, a senior army intelligence officer from 
Kopassus wrote to Onde (the text of the letter is quoted in 
full) saying that he would no longer enjoy their protection 
unless he agreed to 'return to the fold of the Motherland'. 
This was something that Onde had no intention of doing. 
Thereafter, Onde visited the Pacific island of Nauru at the 
time of the annual gathering there of the Pacific Islands 
Forum (though other Papuan representatives were denied 
visas). He used this occasion to circulate information about 
brutalities inflicted on the Papuan people by the TNI. 
The last time Willem Onde and John Tumin were seen 
alive was on 10 September 2001 when they visited the 
director of the Korean timber company, Korindo. Later that 
day, witnesses reported seeing the abandoned motorbike on 
which the two men had been travelling, and items of their 
clothing. Witnesses are quoted as saying they saw Kopassus 
soldiers acting suspiciously and loitering in the area where 
the men had been seen, ordering a logging truck not to stop 
and asking others whether they had sighted John Tumin. 
On 11 September, some children spotted a corpse float-
ing in a river under a bridge. The corpse was pulled out of 
the river and found to be that of John Tumin. His body was 
covered with bruises and there were several bullet wounds, 
indicating that he had been tortured and shot. On 14 
September, the national news agency, Antara, reported that 
Onde was thought to have been murdered because some of 
his belongings had been found, including his blood-stained 
hat. That evening, a second corpse was found in the river 
which was bound in a way as to prevent it from floating 
away. This was soon identified as Willem Onde. His body 
also bore distinct signs of having been tortured and shot. 
Ten days later, Theys Eluay, chair of the Papuan Presidium 
Council, asked the regional government in Jayapura for an 
explanation as to why Onde had been murdered. 
The team of investigators points out that the bodies of the 
murdered men had been disposed of in such a way as to 
ensure their early detection, suggesting that one aim was to 
terrify local residents. The investigators also report many 
scare stories that circulated in the area at the time of the 
disappearance of the two men. 
The investigators conclude by asking why the police and 
civil authorities have made no attempt to investigate the 
murder of Onde and Tumin. They also raise the possibility 
of a link between these murders and the murder of Theys 
Eluay two months later and point to similarities because 
both events can be linked to Kopassus. * 
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Is a zone of peace possible in West Papua? 
While civil society groups have placed their hopes in creating a zone of peace in West Papua, thou-
sands of members of Laskar Jihad have flooded into the province in the past year, amid protests from 
West Papuans that this could lead to inter-religious conflict. Meanwhile, the local police force has 
announced a new operation aimed at clamping down on all 'separatist' groups in West Papua. There 
are fears of a crackdown and moves to instigate conflict. 
In July, the West Papua chief of police, 
Drs Made Mangku Pastika, announced 
that his force would be launching a new 
operation code-named Operasi Adil 
Matoa 2002. Matoa is the generic name 
for police operations in West Papua 
while adil means 'justice'. He said that 
the operation would be directed against 
'separatists', unarmed as well as armed. 
It is feared that such an operation will 
lead to many arrests. But the main objec-
tive is likely to be to incapacitate the 
Papuan Presidium Council which enjoys 
widespread support, especially since the 
assassination last November of its chair-
person, Theys Hiyo Eluay. This can only 
provoke greater unrest and anger among 
the people. 
b T~s opf ration is beii:ig se~n as a mo~e Laskar Jihad is often descibed by analysts as a Frankenstein monster created by hardlin-
y t e po ice to assert Its pnmary role m ers within TN/ and POLRI, the Indonesian armed forces and police. 
West Papua as the force for 'law and order'. . . . . . . . . . 
This does not mean that the operation will necessarily be itles were m?re mterested m preserv~ng temtonal mtegnty 
any less brutal that what the army is capable of doing. than p~otect~ng . the population. This was beca_use West 
Brimob, the elite force of the police, already has a reputa- Papua is so nch m natural resources. [ Cendmwaszh Pos, 18 
tion for great brutality in West Papua. July 2002] 
The police chiefs announcement provoked a storm of 
protest with many fearing that the security forces were 
preparing for a crackdown on pro-independence activists 
and groups. The secretary general of the highly respect 
Traditional Council of Papua, Titus Hamadi, said such an 
operation could only result in new conflicts at a time when 
the general situation in Papua was relatively calm. 
Throwing his weight behind the idea of creating a zone of 
peace, he said the police operation would spread confusion 
over who might be targeted as 'separatists'. It could even 
include village heads or ordinary villagers. 
He said the operation should be discussed at a meeting 
between the regional government, the regional assembly, 
the police chief and the regional military commander and 
the police should meanwhile suspend their operation. 
Another high profile figure to oppose the plan was John Ibo, 
chair of the regional assembly, who said that if the police 
want to end separatism, they should hold public forums to 
promote the idea ofloyalty to the state. [Cendrawasih Pos, 
23 and 24 July 2002] 
Pieter Eli, the Kontras (Commission for the Disappeared 
and Victims of Violence) co-ordinator for West Papua, 
warned that such an operation could result in casualties. He 
accused the Megawati government of adopting the same 
policies as the Suharto New Order and said that the author-
Police chief explains 
Stunned by the strength of opposition to his operation, the 
police chief warned people against making 'exaggerated' 
claims about the intentions of the police. He tried to assure 
people that they would not start arresting people. The aim, 
he said, is to make a proper, 'judicial' assessment of organi-
sations like the Papuan Presidium Council: was it or was it 
not 'lawful', and if not, should it be allowed to exist or 
should it be banned? He said people were talking a lot about 
creating a 'zone of peace' but these very same people were 
holding illegal meetings, discussing plans to attack police 
command posts, and lobbying abroad for support for a 
referendum. Such things would be investigated and deci-
sions would be taken on how to respond. This, he alleged, 
was the only way to create a 'zone of peace'. [Cendrawasih 
Pos, 25 July 2002] '-
A number of local police chiefs have said that they are 
ready to take part in the n~w operation and have already 
gathered data from previous. operations. 
Laskar Jihad poses a new threat 
Since the beginning of 2.000, Laskar Jihad warriors have 
helped to stoke up the bitter inter-religious conflict in 
Maluku. Their arrival in M~luku is widely known to have 
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the support of elements within the Indonesian armed forces. 
[See article on Maluku in this issue.] Even now, following 
the conclusion of an accord to restore peace between the 
Christian and Muslim communities, nothing has been done 
to remove these disruptive forces from Maluku. 
Hence, reports about the arrival ofLaskar Jihad members 
in West Papua has caused alarm among West Papuan 
activists. Laskar Jihad members have been arriving since 
2000, initially in Sorong and then in other parts of West 
Papua. Towards the end of 2001, its notorious 
leader, Jafar Umar Thalib, made a visit to Sorong, 
and since then, the influx has steadily increased. 
Church and human rights activists in Sorong say 
that military training has been taking place, 
initially in isolated bush areas but more recently 
on the premises of a local mosque. They say that 
six Pakistani citizens are involved in these train-
ing sessions. 
In March, twenty church leaders in Sorong 
issued a statement together with eight clan lead-
ers and youth leaders, rejecting the presence of 
Laskar Jihad and drawing attention to the dissem-
ination of inflammatory publications and videos 
alleging that Christians are responsible for 'sepa-
ratist' movements and constitute a threat to 
. WEST PAPUA 
continuation from page 22 
a state visit to Australia in July, said that he supported 
Indonesia's territorial integrity and would not give any 
support for movements pressing for indepen~ence. '<?f 
course we know what is (sic) human rights v10lattons but m 
political terms, we respect the soverei.gnty
1 
and ii:itegrit_y .of 
Indonesia.' Jose Ramos Horta, East T1mor s foreign mm1s-
Indonesia's territorial integrity. A Laskar Jihad ,._ . . . . . . 
bulletin issued in Sorong in January said it was The two leaders of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Prime Minister Mari 
'waging war against Christians because of their Alkatiri (left) and President Xanana Gusmao. 
support for separatist movements in various parts of ter, used even stronger language: 'No government in t?is 
Indonesia'. country (East Timor) should ever be imprudent or foolish 
According to the leading human rights organisation enough to offer sympathy or support for Papua or Aceh's 
ELS-HAM, there are now around three thousand Laskar quest for independence.' He added: 'They (the people of 
Jihad members in West Papua and they have set up a Aceh and West Papua) should accept Jakarta's autonomy 
number of branches of an organisation called offer _ it is genuine.' 
Communication Forum of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah in These positions were at variance with the views of Bishop 
several cities, including Sorong, Fak-Fak, Jayapura, Belo who, according to this report, has declared support for 
Timika, Nabire and Manokwari. the people of Aceh and West Papua. [AAP Newsfeed, 11 
According to reports from Fak-Fak, small boats have July 2002] _ 
been seen arriving since April, each bringing about ten Shortly after this visit to Australia, President Xanana 
Jihad members, apparently from Maluku. Th~y have also Gusmao made a state visit to Indonesia. He had hoped that 
set up communities in Arso, near Jayapura, which has been the visit to Indonesia would come first in his programme of 
the location of large transmigration re-settlement areas for foreign trips but arrangements for the visit to Jakarta ~ere 
newcomers from Java. The Rev. John Barr of Australia's altered because of President Megawati's own sense ofpnor-
Uniting Church, said after a visit to West Papua i~ May, that ities. It is clear that the new government in Dili will do 
he heard many accounts of Jihad training camps m Arso. nothing that might antagonise its largest neighbour and 
In addition to the spread of Laskar Jihad groups, the hopes to build close political and economic ties with a 
army has been actively promoting the establis~ment of pro- country whose armed forces carried out a campaign of 
Jakarta militias known as Satgas Merah Put1h (Red-and- death and destruction during its 25 years of illegal occupa-
White Task Force), whose members are re~ruited. f!om tion of East Timor. * 
newcomer Indonesian communities. This is a sm1ster 
reminder of what happened in East Timor during the 
months prior to the independence ballot in August 1999. 
ELS-HAM recently announced that it had obtained a copy 
of a military document, dated 8 April 2002 and signed .by 
the commander of the Jayawijaya military command, which 
lists the names of eighty local farmers who are members. of 
Satgas Merah Putih in the district,.providi~g. ~onfirmatton 
of the army's direct involvement with the mtl1ttas. 
All in all these developments point to efforts by the 
security force;, the military as well as the police, to insti-
gate trouble in West Papua, '7'hich casts a dar~ shadow over 
civil society's hopes of turnmg West Papua mto a zone of 
peace. * 
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Violence against women in Indonesia 
A report on Violence against Women in Indonesia submitted last year to the UN Committee against 
Torture (CAT) by the Geneva-based NGO, the World Organisation against Torture (OM_CTJ_, has b~en 
published as part of a compilation of ten country reports to the UN's main treaty monitoring ~od1es. 
The Indonesia report examines domestic violence, violence against women in the community and 
violence against women by the state. 
In introducing the report, OMCT notes that 'the poor 
human rights situation and the climate of impunity . .. are 
especially harmful for women and girls. Women in partic-
ular have been targeted for torture and rape by the security 
forces in the regional conflicts in East Timor, Aceh and 
West Papua and they are also frequently subjected to 
violence in the domestic and community spheres.' 
The report was submitted to CAT along with an alterna-
tive report on Indonesia's implementation of the Torture 
Convention prepared by OMCT in collaboration with 
TAPOL [see Supplement to TAPOL Bulletin No 164/165] 
and a report on the relationship between torture and the 
violation of economic, social and cultural rights. 
The report forms part of an OMCT programme which 
focuses on the need for the integration of a gender perspec-
tive into the work of the UN's main human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies. Progress in meeting this need has been 
slow, particularly by CAT, according to OMCT research. 
The compilation includes a useful 'gender-inclusive and 
gender-sensitive' interpretation of the definition of torture in 
Article I of the Torture Convention. Given that much 
violence against women takes place in private, this inter-
pretation concentrates on State responsibility for the acts of 
private individuals. OMCT notes that a growing body of 
human rights law has recognised State responsibility for 
private acts when the State fails to exercise 'due diligence' 
in preventing or responding to such acts. 
The status of women 
In its general observations on the status of women in 
Indonesia, OMCT suggests that gender inequality is 'a 
direct consequence of cultural and traditional practices and 
gender-discriminatory legislation', which reinforce the 
subordinate position of women. As a result, women face 
discrimination in the fields of employment, education and 
political representation and their reproductive and sexual 
rights are frequently seriously violated. 
In considering the status of women in the family, the 
report highlights the explicit discrimination in the Marriage 
Law of 1974, especially the different age requirement for 
marriage for men and women and the provisions regarding 
polygamy and divorce. 
The report expresses concern about limitations on the laws 
on abortion and states that the lack of necessary health care 
for women contributes to the high maternal mortality rate. 
Violence in the family 
Violence occurring within the home takes the form of 
battering, verbal abuse, economic oppression, marital rape, 
incest, and female genital mutilation, says OMCT. NGOs 
estimate that, for a variety of cultural, socio-economic and 
legal reasons, only 15% of domestic violence incidents are 
reported. Many women do not recognise the abuse they are 
suffering as a crime and the authorities are reluctant to regard 
domestic violence as anything other than a private matter. 
Violence in the community 
The report notes that crimes such as rape, sexual harass-
ment and trafficking in women are dealt with under a 
section of the Penal Code on 'crimes against decency', 
suggesting that they are not considered to be in violation of 
a woman's personal rights and bodily integrity, but are 
rather regarded as crimes against a woman's 'honour'. 
Sexual violence is one of the most under-reported crimes 
in Indonesia, and in areas of conflict, rape is often used as a 
weapon to undermine and degrade women from opposition 
groups. Many procedural and institutional obstacles 
confront women wishing to bring charges. There are also 
serious flaws in the Penal Code's definition of rape. 
OMCT highlights its concern about the mass rape of ethnic 
Chinese women during the Jakarta riots of May 1998 which 
preceded the down fall of Suharto [see TAPOL Bulletins No 
147, p. 11 and 148, p. 17]. A Joint Fact-Finding Team 
appointed by the Habibie government speculated that 'the 
riot was created as part of a political struggle in the elite' 
and mentioned by name Major-General Syafrie 
Syamsuddin who was promoted this year to official 
spokesperson of the armed forces, but no further action has 
since been taken and no charges brought. OMCT expresses 
its concern about the lack of protection for victims and 
human rights organisations working to bring justice to the 
victims of the 1998 riots . 
This atrocity and others were highlighted in the report of 
the UN special rapporteur on violence against women 
following her mission to Indonesia and East Timor at the 
end of 1998. 
Further concerns are the growing problems of trafficking 
in women and children and violence against women 
migrant workers. According to OMCT, Indonesia is a 
source, transit point and destination for women trafficked 
for the purposes of prostitution and forced labour. 
Prostitution, is widespread and many prostitutes are under 
the age of 16 years. 
Currently, around two million Indonesians, mostly women, 
work overseas. They are often subject to exploitation, abuse 
and torture and live in conditions similar to those of traf-
ficked women. 
The legislation in all these areas is inadequate, says 
OMCT. The Government has recently set up a committee 
to deal with and prevent trafficking, but it remains to be 
14 TAPOL Bulletin No. 168, September 2002 
seen how effective that will be [DPA, 19 July 2002]. 
Violence by the state 
OMCT draws attention to widespread torture and ill-treat-
ment of women in areas of conflict especially in the form of 
rape and sexual assaults. 
It notes that in Aceh, rape is one of the methods used by 
the military as a weapon of war to terrorise civilians. 
Female family members are raped as a form of revenge or 
punishment or in order to extract information on the where-
abouts of male relatives. However, the practice and expec-
tation of impunity means that few crimes are reported to the 
authorities, let alone punished. The problem is similar in 
West Papua and other conflict areas. 
In the case of East Timor, the report highlights the conclu-
sion of Indonesia's Commission of Inquiry into Human 
Rights Violations in East Timor (K.PP-HAM) that gross 
violations of human rights, including rape and sexual slav-
ery, were perpetrated in East and West Timor in 1999 [see 
also TAPOL Bulletin No 157, pp.12-13]. It should be noted 
that none of the accused in the current ad hoc trials in 
Jakarta [see separate item] are charged with crimes of 
sexual violence Indictments for crimes of sexual violence 
have, however, been issued in East Timor. 
OMCT points out that while torture victims generally are 
confronted with major obstacles when dealing with complaint 
and redress, the victims of rape and other forms of sexual 
violence are even less likely to complain out of fear and 
shame arising from the social stigma attached to the victim 
and the personally violating nature of legal proceedings. 
Conclusions 
The report ends with a number of recommendations to the 
Indonesian Government aimed at addressing the concerns 
highlighted in the report. These include the development of 
a comprehensive policy for the elimination of domestic 
violence, public education campaigns aimed at changing 
patriarchal attitudes and customs preventing the enhance-
ment of the status of women, the strengthening of legisla-
tion in particular areas and the investigation and prosecu-
tion of state officials suspected of torture and violence 
against women. 
It is most unfortunate that this excellent report did not 
apparently convince CAT to pay more attention to the wide-
spread incidence of torture and violence against women in 
Indonesia. The Committee touched on the problem by 
expressing its concern about 'allegations of inadequate 
protection against rape and other forms of sexual violence' 
and recommending that Indonesia should include in its next 
periodic 1"eport to the Committee statistical data dis-aggre-
gated bycgender, but the problem did not receive the atten-
tion it requires. The Committee will need to do much more 
before it can claim to have introduced a meaningful gender 
perspective into its work. 
For a copy of the OMCT report, contact omct@omct.org. 
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journalists refused to leave. She managed, with another 
continuation from page 23 
Dutch journalist, to make her way to the UNAMET 
compound where scores of East Timorese had taken refuge, 
inside the compound and in an adjacent building. 
Having under-estimated the looming danger, UNAMET 
officials initially decided to comply when instructions to 
abandon the compound were received from New York, leav-
ing the refugees and local UN officials to their fate. But a 
Canossian sister, Madre Esmeralda, harangued the officials 
after the vote. 'They voted, now you'll leave us like dogs?' 
This challenge persuaded political officers to tell UNAMET 
head, Ian Martin, that the decision was politically and 
morally wrong and to everyone's relief, the evacuation plan 
was abandoned. 
As this drama was being played out, the three women 
journalists, two Dutch and one American, inside the 
compound, continued to file reports round the clock to the 
outside world. As Dili burned and most of the country was 
in ruins and as 250,000 East Timorese were herded onto 
trucks and boats and taken to West Timor, the UN Security 
Council was forced to wait till President Habibie in Jakarta 
took the decision to allow intervention by an international 
force. Even in the depths of such a crisis, the Security 
Council decided that a decision to send in foreign troops 
could not be taken without Jakarta's approval. 
Bitter Dawn recounts the closing chapter of UNAMET's 
mission with careful attention to detail and coloured by the 
writer's own emotions and frustrations. For anyone wanting 
to know how it felt to live through these dramatic events, 
this is the book to read. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
New Publication: 
Roots of violence in Indonesia 
Contemporary violence in historical perspective 
Colombijn, Freek and J.Thomas Lindblad (eds) 
Jakarta, Sambas, Poso, the Moluccas, West Papua. These 
simple, geograhical names have recently obtained strong 
strong associations with mass killing, just as Aceh and 
East Timor, where large-scale violence has flared up 
again. Lethal incidents between adjacent villages, or 
between a petty criminal and the crowd, take place 
throughout Indonesia. Indonesia is a violent country. 
Many Indonesia-watchers, both scholars and journalists, 
explain the violence in terms of the loss of monopoly on 
the means of violence by the state since the beginning of 
the Reformasi in 1998. Others point at the omnipresent 
remnants of the New Order State (1966-1998), former 
President Suharto's clan or the army in particular, as the 
evil genius behind the present bloodshed. 
ISBN 90 6718 188 9, EUR 27,50 (excl. postage), 348 pages 
Order through: KITLV, PO Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, 
the Netherlands or www.kitlv.nl 
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Indonesian justice in serious trouble 
A UN legal expert severely criticised Indonesia's judicial system during an official mission to the coun-
try in July. The special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Dato' Param 
Cumaraswamy, described the system as one of worst he had studied and said "I didn't realise the situ-
ation would be as bad as I have seen ... ". A recent series of high-profile cases have provided ample 
proof of a system in crisis. 
Most observers agree that the persistent failure of the 
Indonesian authorities to bring the perpetrators of human 
rights violations to justice and widespread judicial corrup-
tion are the most serious concerns. They are indicative of a 
lack of political commitment to legal reform and a lack of 
determination to challenge the influence of the military and 
the rich and powerful. · 
East Timor trials 
During his mission, Mr Cumaraswamy attended the land-
mark trials in Jakarta for crimes against humanity commit-
ted in East Timor. He will have observed a process which 
is a travesty of justice, more likely to entrench impunity 
than end it. 
Although he will not publish his report until the next 
session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in April 
2003 , Mr Cumaraswamy has already expressed his concern 
about the trials, particularly the performance of the prose-
cutors. He questioned the absence of key witnesses and 
asked why prosecutors refused to take account of important 
evidence made available by the UN. 
Referring to the absence of senior officers on trial, he said: 
'We are concerned about whether there was any form of 
selectivism in the various people who are being bought 
before the court and why certain others were not produced. 
I think these are answers that ought to be given by the 
authorities concerned when the time comes.' [Reuters, 20 
July 2002]. 
A report by the respected International Crisis Group 
(ICG) in May criticised the limited mandate of the court, the 
weakness of the indictments and the way in which they 
have been presented by the prosecution to portray events in 
East Timor in 1999 as resulting from a civil conflict 
between two violent factions in which the Indonesian secu-
rity forces were essentially bystanders. 
Unless people such as Mr Cumaraswamy speak out, the 
international community, anxious for closure on East Timor, 
may claim that the Jakarta trials represent progress when in 
reality they are a denial of justice aimed at protecting senior 
officers and covering up the truth of what happened in East 
Tim or. 
Crimes against humanity are crimes of the most serious 
nature and there is a real danger that the court will return a 
few token convictions for what, on the basis of the indict-
ments and evidence presented by the prosecution, amounts 
to little more than criminal negligence. The ICG warns that 
this trivialises the concept of crimes against humanity. It 
also raises questions about the fairness and impartiality of 
the proceedings. 
In many of th~ cases, prosecution witnesses have given 
evidence more favourable to the defence than the prosecu-
tion, for example in blaming the violence on the alleged 
failings and bias of the UN. Prosecutors have been 
behaving more like defence than prosecution coun-
sel in their conduct of the trials. 
The case of Eurico Guterres 
The case of militia leader, Eurico Guterres exem-
plifies the questionable conduct of the prosecution. 
Guterres is charged with the crimes against human-
ity of murder and assault in relation to an attack on 
the home of independence leader Manuel 
Carrascalao in Dili on 17 April 1999 in which 12 
East Timorese were murdered. 
Despite being recorded on film inciting thousands 
of militiamen to 'capture and kill if you need' inde-
pendence supporters who had 'betrayed integration', 
Guterres is not charged with ordering, inciting or 
participating in the attack. He is charged only with 
command responsibility for his failure to control his 
subordinate militias. 
Killing of Sander Thoenes 
Former military commander in East Timor, Brig. General Tono Suratman on The decision by the ~ttorney General ii:t June not 
trial It is doubtful justice will prevail to prosecute the alleged killers of t~e Dutch Journalist, 
Sander Thoenes, was · another victory for military 
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impunity although following Dutch pressure the Attorney 
General's office has indicated that it may re-open the case. 
Sander Thoenes was only one of hundreds killed in East 
Timor in 1999 and hundreds of thousands killed, tortured or 
imprisoned during the 23 years oflndonesia's military occu-
pation, but as a result of investigations carried out by UN 
and Dutch officials, his murder is regarded as one of the 
best documented cases and a test case of Indonesia's seri-
ousness in bringing the Indonesian military to trial. The 
Dutch investigation concluded that Mr Thoenes was shot in 
the back by members of Battalion 745 after he had been 
forced off a motorbike in Dili on 21 September 1999. 
Claims by the Attorney General's office that there was 
insufficient evidence and that a key witness was unreliable 
were rejected by the Dutch and the UN. 
Indonesia's reluctance to proceed with the case may be 
connected to the fact that it exposes the role of army offi-
cers in systematic abuse against civilians. Sander Thoenes 
was one of twelve civilians allegedly killed by Battalion 
745 in three days in September 1999 during its withdrawal 
from East Timor. 
The case was referred to in the Chairperson's Statement on 
East Timor made at this year's session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights. (A statement from the 
Chair, a mechanism used to avoid passing a condemnatory 
resolution, is agreed in consultation with the country under 
scrutiny, which therefore undertakes to be bound by its 
contents.) The decision to close the case demonstrates that 
Indonesia does not regard itself bound by the Chairperson's 
Statement and cannot be trusted to fulfil its commitment in 
the Statement to bring to justice those responsible for other 
rights violations. 
Victims of Suai and Liquica massacres 
denied justice 
An important film, shown by the Sunday programme on 
Australia's Channel 9 in collaboration with the renowned 
filmmaker Max Stahl - East Timor - Justice Denied? - reveals 
how the victims of appalling violence are being denied 
justice by Indonesia and the international community. 
The film raises disturbing questions about the extent to 
which political leaders and the UN are urging reconciliation 
at the expense of justice. It focuses on the massacre of 
dozens of men, women and children in the Suai Church 
compound on 6 September 1999 [see TAPOL Bulletin N~. 
161, p. 12] and the attack on the Liquica Church on 6 Apnl 
1999, when more than 50 people were brutally murdered. 
The film found killers living among the villagers they 
terrorised. One man admits having been present at a death-
squad murder, yet the UN says it has no evidence he was 
even a militia member. The anger of local people at 
attempts to promote reconciliation above all else is apparent 
from this heartfelt response by a counsellor for women 
victims in Liqucia, Filomena Barros Dos Rais: 
'How can I be reconciliated with one people who kill my 
husband, raped me, took all of these things and make me 
like an animal, how can I recon~iliate them? How _can I 
reconciliate with the people consider me as a mosqmtoes? 
How can I reconciliate? I want. . .I can give support for the 
reconciliation but the reconciliation must be with justice.' 
Across the border in West Timor, militia killers are filmed 
living among refugees with apparent impunity. :r~ey 
include the militia leader Isidio Manek, suspected of k1llmg 
the priest Father Hilario at the Suai Church. Manek, who is 
JUSTICE 
The May 1998 riots and its investigation have ended in oblivion 
also accused of kidnapping East Timorese teenager Juliana · 
dos Santos as a war prize, was formerly included in a list of 
suspects compiled by Indonesia's Attorney General, but 
perversely omitted from the final list supposedly because he 
could not be found [AFP, 25 April 2001]. 
The film raises serious questions about the competence of 
UN investigations and highlights the case of a well full of 
bodies near Liquica, bulldozed over by the UN with several 
corpses apparently left abandoned at the bottom. 
The serious crimes unit in East Timor is yet to issue an 
indictment in relation to the Suai massacre and the trials in 
Jakarta of men accused of command responsibility for the 
atrocities in Suai and Liquica will do little to expose the true 
nature of the orchestrated violence which took place. 
The film reminds us how the destruction of East Timor was 
meticulously planned by the Indonesian military, repeating 
a chilling statement made by military commander Tono 
Suratman before the August 1999 ballot: 
'If the pro-independence side wins, it's not going to just be 
the government of Indonesia that has to deal with what 
follows. The UN and Australia are also going to have to 
solve the problem and well, if this does happen, then there'll 
be no winners. Everything is going to be destroyed. East 
Timor won't exist as it does now. It'll be much worse than 
23 years ago.' 
Suratrnan was indicted by the Jakarta court on 4 July, but no 
further information is available about the charges against him. 
West Papua 
Despite being urged to do so by TAPOL, Mr 
Cumaraswamy did not visit West Papua or Aceh. If he had 
been to West Papua, he would have found a complete lack 
of faith in the administration of justice, exacerbated by the 
failure of the authorities to conduct a credible independent 
investigation into the assassination last November of the 
chairperson of the Papuan Presidium Council, Theys Eluay 
[see separate article}. 
Many other serious cases have remained unresolved. The 
well-publicised Abepura case has been stalled by the 
Attorney General's office for a year now. On 7 December 
2000, a West Papuan student was shot dead and around 100 
people were arrested following police raids on student 
hostels in Jayapura. Many of the detainees were tortured and 
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two died in police custody. In May 2001, a team headed by 
the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas 
HA_M) reported that members of the Police Mobile Brigade 
~nm?b) and the local police were responsible for gross 
v10lattons of human rights, including extra-judicial execu-
tions and torture. It recommended that the case be investi- · 
gated further by the Attorney General and the suspects be 
brought to trial in a human rights court [see TAPOL Bulletin 
No 162, p. IS]. The case has been with the Attorney 
General's office since August 2001 with no sign of progress. 
In the second half of 2001, the population of the sub-district 
of Wasior were subjected to a brutal series of abuses by 
Bri~ob. A longstanding dispute between local people and a 
loggmg company came to a climax when three company 
employees and five members of Brimob were killed. Units 
of Brimob sent in to hunt the killers undertook a 'Sweep and 
Crush' operation whose main victims were innocent villagers 
[see TAPOL Bulletin No 163, p. 23]. 
According to a local NGO, ELS-HAM, the operation 
resulted in at least ten summary executions, a number of 
disappearances and the burning of many homes. The 
Indonesian authorities have failed to respond to demands to 
investigate the human rights violations committed during the 
Brimob operations. 
On 6 October 2000~ thirteen Papuans were shot dead 
during police operations to take down symbolic Morning 
Star flags in the highland town of Wamena. Two dozen 
migrants were also killed in a frenzied response by local 
people provoked by the police. Twenty-two Papuans were 
then subjected to a catalogue of rights violations while in 
detention and on trial, including torture and other forms of 
ill~treatment. Another person died in police custody. The 
pnsoners were scapegoated for what became known as the 
'Bloody Wamena Incident' because of their political activi-
ties. They were found guilty of rebellion and other lesser 
offences. They are currently being detained under town 
arrest. One of them, Yafet Yelemaken, died an agonising 
death from poisoning earlier this year [See separate article]. 
No one has been brought to justice for the crimes commit-
ted by the security forces. 
Aceh 
The ending of impunity is key to resolving the conflict 
in Aceh. Opposition to rule from Jakarta has increased in 
line with the failure of the Government to prevent rights 
violations and address impunity. It is likely that many 
victims of human rights violations have been driven by their 
despair at the lack of justice to join the conflict on the side 
of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). 
Despite this, the Government persists in its pursuit of the 
military solution and is doing nothing to ensure the perpe-
trators of human rights violations are brought to justice. 
In 1999, a Presidential Commission to Investigate Violence 
in Aceh concluded that 7,000 violations had occurred 
during and after the period from 1989 to 1998 when Aceh 
was a 'Military Operational Area' (DOM) and identified five 
particularly heinous crimes for investigation and prosecu-
tion [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 157, p. 2]. Subsequently, the 
trial of troops involved in the 'Bantaqiah massacre' in 1999, 
which involved the killing of a Muslim teacher and 56 of his 
pupils, resulted in the conviction of low-ranking troops, but 
the chief suspect, the intelligence chief alleged to have 
ordered the operation escaped justice [TAPOL Bulletin No. 
158, p. 4]. The authorities were heavily criticised for hold-
ing the trial in a joint military-civilian koneksitas court 
which was essentially a military tribunal. There has bee~ 
no progress in any of the other cases. 
In January 2001, Komnas HAM announced that it would 
establish a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the brutal 
killing of three humanitarian workers employed by 
Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims (RATAJ and a 
fourth person in December 2000 [TAPOL Bulletin No. 161, 
p. 4], but the investigation team was never set up. In March 
2001, four civilian suspects escaped from police custody. 
Four military suspects were subsequently released because 
their detention orders expired. 
In August 2001, 31 people were executed at the PT Bumi 
Flora pl~ntation in East Aceh [TAPOL Bulletin No. 163, p. 
1]. Evidence collected by local human rights monitors 
suggests military involvement. A Commission of Inquiry 
(KPP HAM Bumi Flora) has recently been set up by 
Komnas HAM, but only after international criticism of its 
failure to properly investigate the case. 
The investigation into the torture and murder of the 
human rights lawyer, Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, in August 2000 
[TAPOL Bulletin No. 159, p. 1], has produced nothing. 
Hundreds of other cases remain unresolved. 
A ~er~o~s o?stacle to progress in criminal investigations is 
the mt1m1dat10n and even "disappearance" of witnesses. 
When KPP HAM Bum~ Flora started its inquiry in July 2002, 
~nl~ two out of a possible 17 witnesses turned up for ques-
t1~~mg. Reports enierged of a student being forced by the 
m1htary to confess that GAM was responsible for the killings. 
A pap~r presented t? Mr Cumaraswamy by a Coalition of 
I~do~es1an Human Right~ ~GOs - 'Impunity in Indonesia' -
h!ghhghts the vulnerab1hty of judges and lawyers to 
y10~ence by the_ state ~nd GAM. The paper lists numerous 
mc1dents of k1dnappmgs, disappearances killings and 
intimidation of judges, legal counsel and pr~secutors.' 
Tanjung Priok case lies dormant 
An ad hoc human rights court for the Tanjung Priok case, 
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in which scores of people were killed or "disappeared" 
when the security forces opened fire on Muslim demonstra-
tors in 1984, was established by former President Wahid in 
April 2001. Since then, the Attorney General's office has 
apparently buried the case. There are no signs of any indict-
ments and, significantly, no international pressure on 
Indonesia to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
Many people suspected that Parliament recommended the 
ad hoc court because it involved Muslim victims and was 
regarded as a form of compensation for the East Timor case, 
which involved Christian victims. 
A month before the ad hoc court was established, the main 
military suspects, led by former Suharto vice-president and 
Jakarta military commander at the time of the massacre, Try 
Sutrisno, persuaded a number of victims and their relatives to 
agreed to an Islamic peace pact called an Islah. The agree-
ment was intended to lead to the closure of the case. However, 
this form of reconciliation without justice was rejected by 
many of the victims and the Attorney General's office indi-
cated that the pact would not stop further investigations. 
The case is a further illustration of the inversion of the 
normal rules of justice whereby those responsible for the 
massacre remain free while the victims are punished. The 
incident unleashed a ferocious witch-hunt against Muslim 
activists and dozens were jailed. To this day, many complain 
that they are unemployable because companies will not hire 
anyone detained in connection with the incident. 
[For a detailed account of the Tanjung Priok case, see 
TAPOL Bulletin, No. 159, Aug/Sept 2000, p. 22 and the 
TAPOL book Indonesia: Muslims on trial] 
Leniency for Tommy Suharto 
The case of Hutomo Mandala Putra, better known as 
Tommy Suharto, is remarkable for the fact that his convic-
tion for murder and sentence to 15 years imprisonment on 
26 July 2002 were regarded by many as a notable achieve-
ment for Indonesian justice. 
In fact, the rich and powerful son of the former dictator 
got off extremely lightly. He was found guilty of ordering 
the murder of a judge who in 2000 had convicted him of 
fraud in relation to a land-swap deal. Those who carried out 
the murder were sentenced to life imprisonment. In a prop-
erly functioning legal system, the instigator of such a crime 
would expect to receive a sentence at least as harsh as the 
perpetrators. 
Suharto was also found guilty of possessing illegal 
weapons and evading arrest at the end of a trial which 
received far more public attention in Indonesia than the 
concurrent East Timor trials. 
Although the former playboy's profligate lifestyle and 
dubious business ventures will be curtailed by his incarcer-
ation, he is unlikely to suffer undue hardship. His special 
treatment in prison has reportedly included unhindered 
visits from his wife and family, daily consultations with his 
private secretary, personal bodyguards, and access to most 
creature comforts. Although he has decided not to appeal, 
there is concern that he will somehow be able to buy his 
way out of prison before he serves much of his sentence. 
Corruption infects the whole system 
It is an accepted fact that judicial corruption is endemic in 
Indonesia. A report by the watchdog Indonesian Corruption 
Watch (ICW) - Lifting the Lid on the Judicial Mafia: 
I 
JUSTICE 
Research into Patterns of Corruption within the Judiciary -
published on 23 July 2002, shows that every law enforce-
ment agent, ranging from investigators to lawyers, prosecu-
tors, judges and jail wardens, is involved in corruption. It 
found that 'justice seekers have to pay during each stage of 
the administrative legal process before their cases can be 
heard in court'. 
'The court mafia is systemic because it (corruption) and 
the legal system have almost become intertwined,' said the 
report. 'After years of letting corruption spread, it has 
become systemic.' [Jakarta Post, 23 July] 
The problems have been highlighted by the recent deci-
sion by a Jakarta court to wind up the insurance firm, 
Manulife Indonesia, a subsidiary of the Canadian firm 
Manulife. The firm was declared bankrupt for not paying a 
1999 dividend despite the fact that it was solvent. The 
Supreme Court overturned the decision and the judges have 
been suspended and are being investigated as possible 
bribery suspects. 
During his mission, Mr Cumaraswamy said that President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri's government lacked the political 
will to root out corruption and implement reforms. 'It is 
something I feel should never have been allowed to come to 
this extent,' he said [Reuters, 20 July 2002]. 
Many believe that part of the problem lies in the fact that 
the Supreme Court, which supervises the judiciary, is 
largely unaccountable. A Jakarta Post editorial on 25 July 
2002 noted that it is still run by people handpicked by 
Suharto. They are accountable to no one but themselves, it 
pointed out. 'Since most of the judges are the products of 
the repressive regime, they remain as corrupt, if not more 
so, than before,' it added. 
'How much worse can it get?', the paper asked despair-
ingly. Further information about the film 'East Timor-
J ustice Denied' and a transcript can be found at 
http: //sunday. ninemsn. com. au/sunday/cover _stories/arti-
cle_] 097.asp 
NEWSFLASH 
Indonesia's ad hoc rights trials -
a travesty of justice 
Verdicts announced in the trials in Indonesia of seven 
military and police officers and civilian officials who 
were changed with crimes against humanity in East 
Timor during 1999 confirm that the trials are a worthless 
exercise in securing justice for the grave crimes perpe-
trated by the Indonesian security forces and their militia 
proxies. 
Six of the seven defendants were acquitted, having 
been found 'not guilty' by the court. Only one of the 
accused, Abilio Osorio Soares, who was governor of East 
Timor at the time, was found guilty and sentenced to three 
years, although the prosecution had asked for a ten and a 
half year sentence. According to Indonesian law, the 
minimum sentence for the crimes for which he was tried 
and found guilty is ten years, which would appear to 
make this verdict unsustainable. 
continued on p 21. 
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Will these generals ever be bro~ght to trial? 
In the closing years of Suharto's New Order, two atrocities stand out not only for their magnitude but 
for their political impact in hastening the downfall of the dictator. The attack on the headquarters of 
the PDI in July 1996 took place on Suharto's orders to destroy Megawati Sukarnop11:tri's position as 
leader of the party, while the shooting dead of four Trisakti University students in May 1998 was 
followed by riots which led to Suharto's decision to step down. Both cases have been under investiga-
tion for years: the question is, will those responsible ever come to trial? 
On 27 July 1996, hundreds of men dressed in PDI shirts 
and backed by troops and police surrounded and attacked 
the headquarters of the Partai Demokrat Indonesia (PDI) in 
central Jakarta. The building was occupied by supporters of 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, the leader of the PDI, and had 
become the focus for free-speech forums . They were acting 
in defiance of a decision taken by a bogus PDI congress that 
had been held at the behest of Suharto to replace Megawati 
as leader by a Suharto puppet. [The PDI was subsequently 
renamed Partai Demokrat Indonesia - Perjuangan, the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle which is headed 
by President Megawati Sukarnoputri.] 
because the military prevented access to the hospital where 
the wounded had been taken. 
A national police team and then a joint team of the 
national police and the military police have been conduct-
ing investigations into the bloody incident for more than 
two years, but the process has dragged on because of the 
repeated refusal of the attorney-general's office to accept 
dossiers submitted by the team. 
In July this year, it was announced that the investigation 
team had identified retired Lieutenant-General Sutiyoso as 
one of several military suspects. Sutiyoso was commander 
of the Jakarta military command at the 
---------=--~-~-~-- time. Relatives of those who died or 
who were injured have been frustrated 
by the length of time taken to bring 
the case to court. 
Instead of being brought to justice, 
Sutiyoso was appointed governor of 
Jakarta three years ago and has 
provoked many demonstrations 
because of his handling of the capital's 
affairs when severe floods hit the city 
earlier this year and the municipal 
government was accused of failing to 
take the necessary precautions to 
protect the capital against flooding or 
to take care of the victims. 
Megawati backs Sutiyoso 
The rubble after the attacks on the PDI-P Headquarters 
His involvement in the July 27 1996 
attack on the PDI headquarters has 
made him a special target of protest. 
Yet, despite this man's record as 
governor and his role in the July 1996 
bloody incident, he now enjoys the 
unstinting support of President 
Megawati in his bid to win a second 
term as governor of Jakarta. Sutiyoso 
is known to have close business ties 
Rocks, petrol bombs and tear gas canisters were thrown 
into the building, overpowering the scores of people inside. 
The mob forced their way into the building and in the fight-
ing that followed, scores of people were injured. According 
to reports at the time, five people inside the building were 
killed, twenty-three went missing, and nearly 150 people 
were injured. Most of those who escaped unharmed from 
the building were arrested and held for several weeks; many 
were seriously maltreated. Human rights observers said at 
the time that it was difficult to determine the real death toll 
with Megawati's husband, Taufik 
Kiemas. Her decision to back his nomination for the post 
has provoked anger within her own party. 
Hundreds of people, most of them PDI-P members, gath-
,ered in Jakarta to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the 
attack on 27 July 2002 and used the occasion to condemn 
Megawati's support for Sutiyoso. She herself let the occa-
sion pass without any mention of what had happened on 
that fateful day, nor did she express support for the victims 
of the atrocity who had been acting in her name. 
Another officer named as a suspect in this case is Major-
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General Zacky Anwar Makarim who was head of BIA the 
army's intelligence agency, in 1996. Makarim was 'also 
name? as a likely suspect by the Indonesian investigation 
team mto the horrendous events that wreaked havoc in East 
Timor before and after the ballot in August 1999. But he is 
not among the 18 persons now on trial in Jakarta. {See 
separate article.} 
Trisakti and Semanggi cases unresolved 
Students at Trisakti University, on the outskirts of 
Jakarta, and the parents of four students who were shot dead 
in the back when returning to the campus after a peaceful 
demonstration on 12 May 1998 have campaigned vigor-
ously for years for the culprits to be brought to justice. 
The Trisakti demonstration was part of a wave of student 
protest that had gathered momentum since the beginning of 
1998. The killings sent shock waves across the country and 
students came out in even greater numbers, flying flags 
half-mast on their campuses. The day after the killings, anti-
Chinese riots devastated several commercial centres in 
Jakarta; the army stood by as thousands of homes and shops 
were looted and destroyed. At least a thousand people died 
in the riots and scores of Chinese women were systemati-
cally gang-raped. An investigation into the causes of the 
riots and those responsible has come to nothing. With the 
country descending into chaos, Suharto cut short an over-
seas trip and a week later, announced his decision to resign. 
Relentless demands for an investigation into the shoot-
ing by the parents of the four victims persuaded former 
President Abdurrahman Wahid's administration to bring the 
men who shot the students before a military court. But the 
court's decision was not seen as satisfactory as only low-
ranking personnel, who were merely carrying out their 
superior's orders, were sent to jail. 
Lasmiyati, the mother of one of the students, said that 
sentencing the troops did not solve the case because 'their 
superiors should be held responsible for the shootings and 
brought before the court first. 
In August 2001, the National Human Rights Commission 
(Komnas HAM) set up a special commission of inquiry 
known by its Indonesian initials as a KPP-HAM, to investi-
gate the Trisakti incident, along with two other atrocities in 
which a number of students were killed, the Semanggi I and 
Semanggi II incidents (named after the Semanggi flyover 
where the incidents took place). Semanggi I occurred in 
November 1998 when hundreds of students gathered in 
protest against moves to impose emergency laws that would 
have given the military greater powers to 'quell unrest'. 
Security forces opened fire on the peaceful demonstration, 
killing thirteen students. Semanggi II occurred in September 
1999 when students gathered in Jakarta to oppose moves to 
nominate President B.J. Habibie for a second term. One 
student was killed when troops opened fire. 
In setting up the special commission, Komnas HAM was 
exercising its powers under Human Rights Courts Law 
2612000 for the investigation of possible crimes against 
humanity. It was clear from the start that these investiga-
tions would lead to charges of top-ranking army and police 
personnel who were responsible for the way in which the 
security forces behaved. The result has been that both the 
army and the police hierarchy have refused to allow retired 
or serving officers to be questioned by the commission. 
The work of the KPP-HAM was seriously undermined 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
because the DPR, the Indonesian parl iament, had conducted 
its own investigation into the incidents. The special parlia-
mentary commission set up for this purpose came to the 
conclusion that the incidents were not serious human rights 
violations and any court cases should therefore be heard 
before a military tribunal. This has been used by a number 
of officers, including retired General Wiranto, who was 
armed forces commander at the time of the incidents, to 
refuse to respond to summonses from the KPP-HAM. The 
KPP-HAM then announced that they would use their 
powers of subpeona to force the officers to appear but the 
Supreme Court turned down a request to issue a finding to 
this effect. 
Given the insuperable difficulties the commission faced 
in completing its investigations, the KPP-HAM wound up 
its work when its mandate expired. The head of the 
commission, Albert Hasibuan, said that they had reached 
the conclusion that one high-ranking army officer and two 
high-ranking police officers were thought to be involved at 
the strategic level, that eleven high- and middle-ranking 
officers were involved at the operation command level and 
thirty-six middle-ranking officers were involved at the field 
command level. [Jakarta Post, 22 March 2002] 
'We conclude that the killings took place with the full 
involvement of the security officers who used their power 
as well as their weapons in an excessive way, for the sake 
of certain political interests,' Hasibuan said, when submit-
ting the final report to the Komnas HAM. 
After further deliberations by Komnas HAM, the docu-
ments were forwarded to the Attorney General's office for 
judicial investigations that should lead to formal indict-
ments of the suspects. 
There have been many student demonstrations calling for 
the case to be brought to court and for the men responsible 
to be made to account for the crimes. But the documents 
appeared to have been shelved by the Attorney-General's 
office and few people expect any significant move in this 
case in the foreseeable future. * 
continued from p 19. 
In a joint statement issued after the Soares verdict was 
announced on 14 August, TAPOL along with CAFOD, the 
Catholic aid agency, and CIIR, the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations, described the trials as 'a travesty of 
justice aimed at protecting senior Indonesian army officers 
and covering up the truth of what happened in East Timor'. 
They went on to say: '(T)he international community must 
live up to its responsibility for justice by setting up an inter-
national tribunal'. The three organisations also urged the 
international community to provide long-term support for 
serious crimes investigations and prosecutions in East 
Tim or. 
Human Rights Watch, commenting on the Soares verdict 
said: 'The court's action is a mockery of justice. The 
sentence amounts to little more than a slap on the wrist,' 
said Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington director for Asia for 
Human Rights Watch. 'This signals that Indonesia is not 
serious about holding serious abusers accountable.' 
continued on p 3. 
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New revelations about 1999 mayhem in Timor 
Leaked intelligence documents reveal that the devastation wrought in East Timor in the months before 
and after the 1999 ballot were masterminded by a network of top army personnel many of whom hold 
key positions of power in Indonesia today. They remain beyond the reach of justice. 
It is an obscene perversity that, as the first crimes against 
humanity trials in Jakarta reach their conclusion, and as the 
US moves closer towards re-engagement with the Indonesian 
military (TNI) as part of its 'war against terrorism', many of 
Indonesia's own practitioners of state terror, those who 
orchestrated the devastation of East Tim or in 1999, are still 
in power or active politically, stifling reform and practising 
their dark arts in places such as Aceh and West Papua. 
Indonesia is clearly to blame for not ensuring that senior 
generals are made to account for their crimes and for not 
acknowledging the truth of what happened in East Timor, 
but the international community bears the primary respon-
sibility for allowing Indonesia to protect its own. 
The evidence of a systematic campaign against the civil-
ian population of East Timor, planned and directed at the 
highest level, is available in abundance, most notably in 
leaked Australian intelligence materials published in March 
this year in the Sydney Morning Herald. 
Transcripts of intercepted messages between Indonesian 
officers who ran the campaign of violence and their militia 
proxies reveal a covert chain of command down from the 
then President Habibie's feared co-ordinating minister for 
politics and security, General Feisal Tanjung, a Kopassus 
General Faisal Tandjung appeared as a witness in the East 
Timor adhoc trials. Showing no remorse, he went onto the 
offensive and blamed the UN for the East Timor tragedy. 
special forces veteran, to army generals and militias on the 
ground in East Timor. Little attention has so far been paid 
to Tanjung's pivotal role in the devastation of East Timor. In 
his retirement, he is still active in Indonesian party politics. 
The intercepts show that a network of officers master-
minded the campaign of violence and intimidation aimed at 
producing a vote against independence in the August 1999 
ballot. When they failed in that objective, they organised the 
killing of hundreds of independence supporters, the forcible 
deportation of one-third of East Timer's population, and the 
destruction of three-quarters of the country's infrastructure. 
Tanjung was ably assisted, according to the intercepts, by 
Habibie cabinet members, AM Hendropriyono (currently 
Indonesia's supreme intelligence chief and a member of 
Megawati's cabinet), and Yunus Yosfiah (implicated in the 
killing of five Western newsmen in Balibo, East Timor in 
1975) as well as Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, now in 
the influential position of spokesperson of the armed forces. 
The key officer running the militia in East Timor was 
Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim who is still attached 
to TNI headquarters. He was named as a suspect in the 
Indonesian Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights 
Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM), published in January 
2000, but there is no sign of him facing prosecution. 
Major-General Mahidin Simbolon, who gave his name to 
the notorious Mahidi militia group and referred to them as 
'his crew', is now military commander of West Papua where 
it is widely feared that militias will replicate their role in 
East Timor. 
Key elements of the Indonesian campaign included the 
dispatch to East Timor in February 1999 of special forces 
units code-named Tribuana and Venus to join undercover 
operations and the insertion of hit squads of special forces, 
code-named Kiper-9, to target independence supporters at 
the time of the arrival of INTERFET international troops in 
September 1999. 
There is grave concern in Australia that the vital evidence 
contained in these intelligence intercepts has not been 
shared with UN or other investigators. Given the failure of 
accountability in Indonesia, it is absolutely essential that 
international justice takes its course and that Australia takes 
the lead in ensuring that the facts about the crimes against 
humanity committed in East Timor are fully exposed. 
Dili's views on Aceh and West Papua 
Many activists campaigning for Aceh and West Papua 
were disappointed to learn that leading personalities in the 
newly-established East Timorese government fully support 
Jakarta's position on Indonesia's territorial integrity and 
have urged the people of these territories to accept special 
autonomy as introduced by the Jakarta government. 
East Timer's president, Xanana Gusmao, speaking during 
continued on page 13 
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Bitter Dawn: East Timor, a People's Story 
by Irene Cristalis, ZED Books, London, 2002 
After three years of breathtaking changes, transforming 
it from a down-trodden, occupied country to the first newly-
independent state of the 21st millennium, East Tim or has 
become the subject of a flood of books, dissecting the 
fortunes and misfortunes of the country from many angles. 
It is a subject that casts a penetrating light in particular on 
the malicious efforts by the Indonesian military to counter 
the decision, taken in January 1999 by President B.J. 
Habibie to allow the East Timorese to decide for themselves 
whether they wanted to accept special autonomy or extri-
cate themselves from their Indonesian tormentors. 
Bitter Dawn can be counted as one of the best accounts 
of the tragic events that preceded and followed the ballot on 
30 August 1999 when 80 per cent of the infrastructure was 
left in ruins and a quarter of the population was forced to 
abandon their homes to become refugees in West Timor. 
The prose is lucid, making this a highly readable book full 
of drama and sympathy for the victims of these terrible 
events. 
Cristalis spent the year before the ballot in East Timor, 
travelling widely and using her journalistic skills to under-
stand a people deeply traumatised by 23 years oflndonesian 
occupation and daring to hope that at last things would 
change. While her commitment to East Timor's cause is 
never in doubt, her frank and sometimes critical accounts of 
the people she met - local commanders of Falintil, the 
armed resistance, leaders of the Catholic church, human 
rights activists, militia fighters and ordinary people, as well 
as UN officials - leave the reader with a refreshing sense of 
diversity that challenges the often stereotype accounts of a 
people united around a common cause. 
BOOK REVIEW 
The book is studded with carefully crafted portraits of 
individuals trying to adjust to the situation, the euphoria that 
greeted the decision to hold a 'popular consultation', which 
was rapidly overtaken by fear and apprehension as army-
backed militias took control in many parts of the country, 
compelling 100,000 East Timorese to flee their homes and 
become 'internally displaced people'. The turning point was 
the 6 April 1999 Liquica Church massacre which rammed 
home the message that churches could no longer be 
regarded as sanctuaries. The massacre was also intended, 
the author argues, to disrupt talks underway at the UN in 
New York to agree the modalities for the ballot. Her account 
of a visit to Liquica to attend mass on the Sunday after the 
massacre vividly portrays the depth of the fear gripping the 
population. Even with Bishop Belo there to take the mass, 
congregants held back in fear and trickled very slowly into 
the church. This was the first time, Belo later said, that he 
had ever turned up to an empty church. 
Eleven days later, the home of Manuel Carrascalao in 
Dili, where dozens of Timorese were taking refuge, was 
attacked by Aitarak militia under Eurico Guterres (whose 
trial is now underway in Jakarta). This was intended to 
convey the message that 'turncoats' like Carrascalao who 
had switched from supporting integration with Indonesia to 
supporting independence were in the sights of the killers. 
One of her constant companions was Antero Bendito da 
Silva, head of the East Timor Students Council which had 
responded to the reformasi demonstrations in Indonesia that 
drove Suharto from power in May 1998 by mounting a 
nationwide 'open forum' campaign. But Antero was so 
obsessed with thinking about conflict resolution and design-
ing future education projects for the Timorese that he often 
seemed blissfully unaware of the chaos and danger 
surrounding him and needed to be rescued many times. 
Another character, Mana Lou, an irrepressible 'secular 
nun', is fondly portrayed. She pursues her own brand of 
grassroots Catholicism, dedicated to trying to restore 
people's sense of self-esteem and identity which, she says, 
is what faith is all about. This put her at loggerheads with 
Bishop Belo on the one hand and Falintil leaders on the 
other. Called by some the 'Joan of Arc' of East Timor, she 
tried to persuade militia members of the folly of their ways 
while organising food and medicine for the thousands of 
'internally displaced people' (IDPs) around Liquica. 
Another fascinating character who pops up frequently is 
a Falintil commander known as L7, a flamboyant guerrilla, 
fond of delivering speeches, of being the centre of attention 
and a heavy drinker, when supplies were available. Yet with 
all that, he was the proud head of a Catholic youth organi-
sation, Sagrada Familia (Sacred Family) that claimed (justi-
fiably, she was told) to have a membership of 60,000. 
The author is no faint-heart. She visited some of the most 
dangerous places in the country as the ballot drew near. A 
constant theme is her puzzlement at the failure of the staff 
of the UN mission, UNAMET, to take seriously the threats 
of the militia, on behalf of their paymasters, to plunge the 
country into chaos, should the vote swing heavily in favour 
of independence. When East Timor descended into chaos 
and mayhem erupted just before the ballot results were due 
to be announced, hundreds of foreign and Indonesian jour-
nalists fled the country in the face of constant harassment. 
The intention was clear - to ensure that the coming events 
would not get reported. But the author and several other 
continued on page 15 
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Appeal to support former tapols 
We have been asked to publish the following appeal by Lembaga, which was set up to support 
former political prisoners. This is one of several organisations working for former political pris-
oners in Indonesia, devoted specifically to the needs of prisoners taken into custody in 196511966. 
During the Suharto military regime which lasted over 30 
years, massacres, arbitrary detentions and kidnappings were 
commonplace in Indonesia. The worst period was 1965-
1966 when about I million people were killed, and about 1,8 
million people arbitrarily detained without trial, in prisons 
and detention camps controlled by the military or police. 
Thanks to international pressure, the political prisoners 
have all been released, though in many cases after more 
than 10 years imprisonment. Many were in poor health, 
many were aged. Some had lost all their property through 
illegal confiscation by the military. 
The detainees came from all walks oflife, the military, civil 
servants, teachers, trade union leaders, and women's, peas-
ants and students organisations. Most were detained because 
of their alleged links with, or sympathy for, the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI), or because of false accusations. 
The situation today 
The political prisoners suffered from all kinds of ill-treat-
ment and many worked as forced labourers. Tens of 
millions of family members were also victims of systematic 
state terrorism and psychological persecution for more than 
30 years and many are still traumatised. 
Even today, ex-political prisoners suffer from administra-
tive restrictions introduced under Suharto, which deprive 
them of their civil rights. Former government civilian and 
military employees, sacked during the Suharto regime, 
receive no pensions or salaries. Those who are still able to 
work are not allowed to work. Many receive no medical 
help and live in extreme poverty. They are treated as 
second-class citizens or pariahs. Even now, there are 
instances of political and psychological persecution by 
remnants of the military regime and some fundamentalist 
Muslim groups. 
In order to defend their fundamental rights as human beings 
and as citizens, ex-political prisoners have created an organ-
isation. The Institute of Advocacy for the Rehabilitation of 
Victims of the New Order" (Lembaga Perjuangan 
Rehabilitasi Karban Rezim Orde Barn) called LEMBAGA, 
a non-governmental organisation, was launched on 16 
January 2000 in Jakarta, and is now established in Java, 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali, Maluku. Its members 
come from various ethnic groups and religions. 
The aims of LEMBAGA are to urge the Indonesian govern-
ment to abolish all remaining repressive regulations and 
decrees applied to ex-political prisoners and other victims of 
the Suharto regime and to restore their civil rights In co-
operation with other democratic forces, LEMBAGA will 
struggle against the remnants of the inhuman policies of the 
military regime of Suharto. Together with other national and 
international organisations, LEMBAGA aims to promote a 
democratic struggle for peaceful reform in political, 
economic and social life in Indonesia. 
LEMBAGA needs the help and actions of solidarity of 
other organisations abroad: 
a) We would like, with other Indonesian organisations, to 
launch a world-wide campaign about the human rights of the 
tens of millions of ex-political prisoners and their families 
b) To work in contact with other organisations in different 
countries. 
c) We would like your solidarity in making known our aims 
to international public opinion 
d) We need your moral and material/financial support to 
achieve our aims in the difficult political, economic and 
social environment of Indonesia today. 
Postal address: LEMBAGA, Jalan Raya Bogor Km 22 
No 31, Jakarta Timur 13830, phone 62-21- 8400309 E-
mail: patria@semarang.wasantara.net.id 
Annual rates 
(six issues) 
lndi'1iduals 
Unwaged 
Institutions 
